

THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

Edited by the VERY REV. S. C. CARPENTER, D.D., THE DEANERY, EXETER, to whom MSS. should be sent. Reviews and all business communications should be addressed to S.P.C.K., NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE, LONDON, W.C. 2.

Vol. XXXII

APRIL, 1936

No. 190

EDITORIAL

So the Reformation is to be commemorated. It will be the fourth centenary of a year that was not in all respects fruitful for the Church in England, but some date had to be chosen for the commemoration, and, inasmuch as what is proposed has no relation either to the Greater Monasteries or to tithe, but is concerned with the English Bible, it will serve. The decision to concentrate upon the Bible was a wise one. There will no doubt be some who will expand their brief and enlarge upon the blessings of deliverance from "detestable enormities" in general, and others who will praise the "ordered liberty" enjoyed in the English part of the Catholic Church. This is to be expected. We are what we are, and the consequences of us will be what they will be. Why, then, should we wish to deceive? But the chief thanksgiving, in which we can all whole-heartedly unite, will be a *Te Deum* for the English Bible. That is so wise. And it will be, this time, a healthy unity. There have been periods when joint-appeals to the Bible have been erected on a rather jerry-built platform. Dr. Pusey and Lord Shaftesbury forgot that they were heterodox cousins and joined in an earnest but not very holy alliance against the temerarious and neologistic but not inopportune and really not wholly pestiferous volume *Essays and Reviews*. It was a little like a *mariage de convenance* contracted in order to prevent a family property from passing into questionable hands. And since then there have been occasions when a Catholic and a Protestant have ceased to suspect one another because they have stood together, as St. Thomas's angels did not, on a point that was not really there at all.

This will not happen now. We understand more about the Bible. It has not, be it said at once, lost any of its force. We are quite sure that it is our Charter. We appeal to it. It

remains the Book, the holy Book, the Book of our religion, the Book from which we learn infinitely more than from little flowers in crannied walls, "what God is and what man is." There is no substitute for the Bible. There has been nothing like it since. Those who are most familiar with the *Imitation*, or *Pilgrim's Progress*, or other classics of devotion, and owe most to them, will be foremost in acknowledging that the Bible is supreme. Yet we have learned to use the Bible with more intelligence, with the spirit and to some extent with the understanding also. The old clichés, "We are told," "The Sacred Narrative informs us," have dropped out of use. It is not exactly that they are false. They are correct enough. But they suggest a sort of external application which does not meet the needs of which we are conscious. The feeling that we now have about the Bible is that it breathes an ethos which we want to have in our own lives. To recapture and reproduce, so far as may be possible, the Bible view of life is an urgent necessity. Circumstantially, it is of course impossible. Even apart from the lapse of centuries and the difference between East and West, the Totalitarian Church of the Old Testament will not reappear in Europe, and we are not at present likely, on the other hand, to return to the very completely non-Established and non-Endowed Church of the New Testament. It is not that. It is a way of looking at things. It is a way of believing in God. It is a way of expecting God to act. It is a cultivation of the habit of thinking of our life as a response, and of giving obedience.

The differentia of the Bible is that it is all about God. Nothing else matters. Let God be true, and every man—if it should come to that—a liar. Is not that the secret of its perpetual fascination? God does not come to an end. A good-hearted but rather prosaic young man, expecting before long to be admitted to Holy Orders, once expressed the fear that in his first half-dozen sermons he would have exhausted all the moral and spiritual thoughts that he had ever had. We do not know what eventually happened, or what the testimony of his congregations is. But that young man has now had many years of ministerial life, and we suspect that the Bible has come to the rescue. The Bible is inexhaustive, because it is all about God. That is its secret. Was it, allowing of course for the gulf of difference between Olympus and the real Throne of Grace, the secret of Homer too? Everyone knows that Homer was the Greek Bible. Sir Arthur Quiller Couch, no mean authority, suggests another explanation, doubtless true as far as it goes. Homer was national. In *The Poet as Citizen* he writes: "To

the whole Hellenic world, scattered though the tradition was over an age of enquiry, 'Homer' stood for Holy Writ. We find him quoted with awe, as old-fashioned Protestants quoted the Bible, holding it verbally inspired: and this throughout, often to our surprise, when Homer happens (as he not infrequently does) to be saying nothing in particular. But for the Greeks—his antiquity aiding—the Iliad and the Odyssey held their racial religion, if in solution." Another writer, Mr. Stephen Paget, less scholarly but perhaps more simply human—although Sir Arthur has notable flashes of that rare quality—in his charming *New Parent's Assistant* takes another view of what the Greeks really wanted. He recalls the Greek women at the Festival in the Idyll of Theocritus, trying—how often we have seen it!—to enjoy the spectacle and keep the children quiet at the same time. "Tell me about the gods, mother," pipes a little voice; "I want about the gods." And on this childish, no doubt exasperating, reiteration, "I want about the gods, mother," he constructs a little parable, which has its scene not in Sicily alone. At all events, that is, unquestionably, the charm of the Bible. We do want about God.

Sometimes it seems to us, in earthly or what we are often pleased to call humane moments, that there is perhaps too much about God and not enough about man. To a hostile critic it might seem that the essential dignity of man is not adequately maintained. Never having read Ezekiel ii. 1 ("Son of Man, stand upon thy feet and I will speak with thee"), they say that man is exhibited in the Bible as grovelling on all fours, not in the erect posture befitting one who has ceased to be *pithecanthropus* and has become *homo sapiens*. Even the friendly critic may feel at times that belief in God is being fed at the expense of belief in man. A few years ago there was a useful book actually called *Belief in Man*, by Mr. P. S. Richards. Canon Quick wrote a foreword to it. It was concerned to restore a balance which seemed to the writer to have been rather lost—though not indeed through the Bible—in recent thought. The book was timely, but in another connection. To return to the Bible, this doubt of the friendly critic is only a passing cloud of misgiving. He soon finds out that the Bible knows all about man, and sets him on quite as good a stance as he deserves. In any case, the Gospel of the Incarnation cannot be accused of forgetting about Flesh. It is the central truth of the Gospel that the Word found there a not impossible medium of expression. What, we wonder, did Meredith mean exactly by this:

We do not get to heaven by renouncing the Mother we spring from: and when there is an eternal secret for us, it is best to believe that Earth knows it, to keep near her, even in our utmost aspirations.

Whatever he meant, the Incarnation is the answer to the implied queries, the ground of the implied hopes. "For verily not of angels doth he take hold, but he taketh hold of the seed of Abraham."

There are some recent books about the Bible which it is a pleasure to commend. Mr. Richmond Noble's *Shakespeare's Biblical Knowledge* has already been reviewed in our columns, and it can hardly be classed as theological. It is a thoroughly scientific literary study, which takes into consideration the English versions which were extant in Shakespeare's lifetime, and even the Lectionary which was then authorized in the Church of England. The enquiry here relates only to the Morning Lessons, as it is assumed that theatrical engagements would occupy Shakespeare on Sunday afternoons. The author's verdict, which is that the poet was a careful private reader of the Bible, first the Bishops', then in later life the Geneva version, and had, further, a remarkable knowledge of the Psalter in the Prayer Book version, is supported by a scholarly array of observed facts, many of which seem new. Quite incidentally, and in no sense as part of his argument, he mentions an exceedingly odd coincidence. In the Authorized Version of the Psalter (which was in course of printing when Shakespeare was forty-six years of age), and in no other version previously, in the 46th Psalm, the 46th word from the beginning combined with the 46th word from the end (not counting the direction *Selah*, which is no part of the text) makes the name Shakespeare.

Of another kind are two books from the pen of Canon H. L. Pass. He has followed *The Glory of the Father*, an illuminating study of St. John xiii.-xvii., with *The Divine Commonwealth*, devoted to the Beatitudes. Theology has high scope, and plain needs are well understood in this book on the Bible, itself written "according to the pattern shewed in the mount." It is very much to be expected that the approaching quatercentenary will produce much Biblical literature. Some of it will be poor stuff. But if it were all as good as the informing volume just published by the Dean of Wells, it will be useful. "I think we have had," said a blunt-spoken dignitary to the Editor not long ago, "enough about the Sacraments. It is time we had something about the Bible." True, sir, but it is

possible to combine the two subjects, as Dr. Mozley does in his *The Sacraments of the Gospel*, a masterly example of how the theology of the New Testament can be applied. And let us not forget Father William Lutyens' Johannine study, *Sons of God*. With slight embarrassment, but without any real shame, we have just realized that the books named in this paragraph are all written by Cambridge men.

It is interesting to notice how the modern exegesis of the Bible differs from what we used to get. Dr. Swete was probably the last scholar-editor of the old pattern. Those—and they should be many—who still read his commentaries on St. Mark and the Apocalypse, though they will often be grateful for his stores of patristic learning, for the illumination that he sheds on Bible passages from other Bible passages, and for what Dr. Sanday once called the *mitis sapientia* of his own exegesis, will sometimes find that the very point on which they particularly wanted a note is passed over. It is learned, orthodox exposition of the best kind—out of the old box, the box designed by Ellicott and constructed by Westcott and Lightfoot. In some respects it is more serviceable for the majority of those who use it than Westcott's work, because in everything that Dr. Swete wrote he was consciously remembering that "Sacred Study" which is one of the major duties of the English clergy, and there was nothing he desired more than to put his own gifts and labours at their service. The whole of his long and scholarly life was his way of fulfilling his own Ordination vows. But his writing does not attain to Westcott's prophetic height. Westcott may sometimes have exaggerated the harmony that he loved to find in Scripture, but those who read him patiently will acknowledge that he had an ear to respond to the deep note of revealed truth. How different in method from either are the new books! Their authors do not describe themselves as "psychological critics" in quite the modern literary sense. They do not busy themselves with imagining Freudian unmentionabilities which the prophets were afraid to think, or conjecturing unsavoury scandals about the parents of Tryphena and Tryphosa. They leave these extravagancies to those who have a taste for them. But in all contemporary exposition there is real psychology. The expositors are interpreting the testimony of divinely moved writers in a way which, without failing to do justice to its inspired accent, nevertheless treats it as human language.

If eagle eyes have detected any typographical inexactitudes, some of the few occasionally committed by even our best

of printers (and even that is mostly not their fault) in this or the preceding number of THEOLOGY, it may be charitably set down to the Editor's bodily infirmity. To the same cause may be assigned, by a few whom it concerns, a certain uncommendable procrastination in correspondence. The bacillus of old age has attacked him here and there, and it happens that these lines were written in a hired tenement at Bath in the intervals of a cure. This is only a superficial and unsubstantiable apologia, but, in the absence of any other, it will have to serve. It is the fact that the labour of handling manuscripts and proofs, never his whole-time occupation, has been and is a little irksome. The interest of walking, or limping, through the majestic portals into the editorial sanctuary, whose columns "make us We," does not abate.

THE CHURCH

A PAPER READ AT A CLERICAL MEETING

ANYONE who attempts to write a paper on the Church finds his method in large measure determined for him by the character of his subject. He must deal with the nature of the Church, essentially and as it appears in history, and its origin, when and how it came to be. Subordinate to these questions and involved in them is that of its continuity with the previously existing Jewish polity.

As to the nature of the Church, we see at once that it was two-sided. Looking upon it with the outward eye, it would be regarded as an international society of men and women existing for religious purposes, and holding certain views which it desired to propagate. As such it would be one among other international organizations, with the ordinary power of admitting new members with forms of initiation determined by itself, and, if need be, of expelling and readmitting old members, and of appointing or degrading officials; but in each nation the civil authorities would regard it as subject to the national will expressed through the legitimate machinery of government. Before dismissing this view as inadequate it will be of service to consider what is implied by a religious society, and in what respects religion differs from its caricature, which may be called magic.

Both religion and magic have this much in common, that each recognizes the existence of superhuman beings, and in this respect they differ from the outlook of merely civil societies existing solely for the temporal welfare of their members. But here they part company.

The fundamental note of magic is that it is self-seeking and self-interested, whether the self be regarded as a single individual or a group. In consequence it tends to regard the interests of other beings, human or divine, as indifferent or as hostile. Magic is always limited in its outlook, and cannot take a wide-world or catholic view, while as regards the supernatural beings whose existence it recognizes, it looks upon them as powers to be cajoled or coerced. A really religious person, on the other hand, desires to serve rather than to rule, to give rather than to get. It will be seen that in motive the two are fundamentally opposed, and that the strength of the one is the weakness of the other.

Religions contemporary with early Christianity fall into two main groups—and these will include those later religions that have not outgrown the earlier stages—heathenism of all kinds and Judaism. The fundamental weakness of heathenism, as Isaiah saw, is that the gods are human deifications of natural objects or processes, or of men, but are not real gods. They have powers, but the powers which they appear to exercise are the results of the mass-suggestion of their worshippers—that is, we can speak of the powers of the gods of the heathen in something of the same sense in which we speak of the power of a great idea, meaning the powerful influence of those who hold it, the “power” of suggestion.

In contrast with all forms of heathenism is Judaism. The fundamental notes of Judaism are its doctrines of creation and election. Man is a being made by God, and in consequence he is by nature subordinated to Him, and under an obligation of service. He is to believe what God has revealed, and do what He has commanded. This is a principle of natural justice. But two other doctrines were added to these. The one was an ever-growing conception of God's inherent goodness, and the other of His beneficent activity towards mankind, and especially towards His own people, and a definite promise of a future manifestation of deeper significance and on a wider scale. How far the proclamation of the oneness and the goodness of God and the promise of the future was based on a new prophetic insight dating from the time of Amos onwards is still in dispute, but it is clear that the prophets themselves thought, rightly or wrongly, that they were but proclaiming truths inherent in Judaism from the beginning, which had been overlaid by paganism and lapsed out of sight. The discipline of Judaism was thus a discipline of expectation resting on a reiterated promise. Whether the future gift would actually benefit those on whom it was conferred depended on their dispositions; their duty in the meanwhile was to wait for it, and so to govern their conduct that they would be fitted to receive it, the time and form of it being in God's hands.

Christianity, while taking up all that was true in Judaism, rests on the actual fulfilment of the promise in history in Jesus Christ. The Christians of the first generation were faced with two tremendous problems. Many of them had known Christ after the flesh either directly or at most at second-hand, and had learnt to admire Him, to love Him, and to worship Him; but His human character, as they had seen it and learnt to appreciate it, was a far finer and nobler thing than their conception of what was the character of God. Hence they found themselves compelled to re-think the character of God in terms of the human character

of Jesus Christ. If they had not yet reached the conviction that Jesus Christ was God made man (and if we interpret the phrase "Son of God" messianically the earliest direct evidence would seem to be that of some twenty years after the Resurrection), they recognized that He was a God-made man; that is, that by means of a self-subjugation, in which He exercised His human will, He was completely dominated by grace or by the Holy Spirit: and though between a human being perfected by grace and raised to the throne of God, and God Incarnate there is in fact a tremendous theological gulf, yet this distinction was not and is not manifest in a Christian's experience of the risen Christ. Moreover, if God had the character of Jesus Christ, then the self-sacrifice involved in the Incarnation and the Passion was perfectly natural to a God of that nature.

But the theological distinction is nevertheless vital. A divinized man might be regarded as the finest human product, but no process of human development could result in an incarnate God.

The fact and the doctrine of the Incarnation are two of the greatest novelties of Christianity. The Jewish conception of the Messiah hovered between an angelic being in the form of man with no real humanity, and a highly endowed human being who most assuredly was not God; the reality of God becoming man was beyond the furthest horizon of Jewish thought. Though the Incarnation had been prepared for by other examples of God's action, yet it is in itself so tremendous a mystery, that if we are to look for them we must seek them on a cosmic scale. In the lowest grade of reality we place the purely conceptual order such as is best exemplified by pure mathematics or symbolic logic. But though modern physics is becoming increasingly mathematical, it can never be wholly so; the actual concrete world can never be fully and adequately represented by a mathematical equation or series of equations; it has not only a conceptual but also a perceptual kind of existence. The material world began once not *in*, but, as St. Augustine says, *with* time, whereas a purely conceptual order is necessarily timeless. The realm of matter has other than mathematical qualities, and though by a perfectly legitimate process of abstraction we might conceivably find mathematical expressions for all the processes of physics and chemistry, yet concrete matter cannot be manufactured or evolved from mere concepts; and, in the last resort the mathematician himself is inexplicable in terms of mathematics. Man, the mathematician included, is in a certain sense a summary of all previous stages. By a series of successive abstractions we can in thought reduce him to a lower level. Mankind is the genus of human beings; the

individual man is a specimen, and the race a species of animals; animals, again, are a species of material bodies, and the individual material object can for certain purposes be legitimately treated as a mere statistical unit. There is thus a kind of continuity downwards, but there is no real continuity either in fact or in thought upwards. The moralist or legislator bases his science or art on the existence of qualities in man which do not exist in animals or plants in their natural condition, even though by a kind of induced psychology some traces of personality may appear in a domesticated animal such as the dog; or to put the case in an epigrammatic form you can murder a man but only kill a pig; man has a prerogative over the beast in that he alone can make a beast of himself. So the biologist demands new categories of thought beyond those supplied to him by physics and chemistry. Even if in our laboratories we could see protoplasm become alive, we should have no intellectual conception of how the transformation took place. Though it is clear that at some time non-living matter became alive on this planet, yet this process of abiogenesis is not a law of nature but an exception, and similarly though from some form of non-personal ape man came, yet this again is an exceptional occurrence, the law being that persons spring only from persons.

Thus each lower order, while it is receptive of a new power by which the higher is produced, is in itself incapable of producing it by any inherent forces of its own. An illustration of this fact in the realm of psychology I have already brought forward in the way in which the dog by association with man seems to take on through a process of education a quasi-human personality; so it might be said that man by living in the court of heaven seems to acquire a kind of heavenly-mindedness which he could only attain under these conditions, and which was beyond his own inherent powers to produce in himself. But perhaps the best illustration of the series of cosmic exceptions to natural law is in the virgin conception of our Lord. Faith and obedience were the receptive conditions, virginity the symbol of impotence, of the Blessed Mother to produce by powers of her own the Saviour of the world, as faith and obedience are the receptive conditions of the salvation of men but not its cause. But there is a further advance beyond the human level in which the same principle of God's actions holds. Above the earthly life of our Lord is the heavenly life in which He now reigns in glory. And the Resurrection and glorification were not wrought by our Lord as man in the exercise of any powers of His engraced humanity, but on Him by God. Nowhere in the New Testament is Christ said to have raised Himself; the verbs used are invariably either neutral, "He rose," or passive, "He was raised," no-

where are they middle; and similarly in the Apostolic Fathers, but for a single passage in Ignatius, while in another passage Ignatius says the Father raised Him. Thus as man is the summary of all the lower orders of the created world, so in Christ the whole created universe is raised, in sample or in firstfruits (to use the scholastic phrase *formaliter*), to the right hand of God; the ultimate purpose of its creation is in him accomplished; it is raised by the power of God out of nothingness to infinity. In consequence, in our experience we can draw no distinction between the influence of God the Father upon us, of God the Son, of God the Holy Ghost, or of Jesus. While He was on earth the range of our Lord's human acquaintanceship and therefore of His human sympathy was actually limited, now there is no one outside the range or depth of His sympathy, His understanding, His love; they can only be equated with the wisdom and love of God Himself, and this without ceasing to be human nevertheless.

It is with this risen, ascended, glorified life of Jesus that the Church lives. As the human race is said in the Bible story to have sprung from Adam, or the Jewish race from Abraham, so the Christian race springs from Christ as its unique origin. As the Levites are said to have paid tithes to Melchizedek being yet in the loins of Abraham, so the Christian Church existed in the Christ from the time of His Ascension as, to use a legal phrase, a "corporation sole." It is no more a product of human evolution than Christ Himself. It lives, as He did on earth, with a human life, but above and beyond that it is dowered with an existence supernatural to ordinary humanity, as man is above the animals and plants, or they above non-living objects; and this not by any action of its own, but by the reception of a divine creative activity. This is the foundation of the Christian life, individual or social, as enunciated by St. Paul. All earlier religions were efforts to climb up from earth to heaven by a sort of Tower of Babel; the new Jerusalem, as St. John saw it, came down from heaven to earth; the Christian dwells already in the heavenlies; the sin of Christians is sacrilege because each and all are temples of the living God.

And the divine life is essentially one of self-devotion, self-giving, self-impartation. As humanity started in time, as the Incarnation took place at a definite epoch, so the Christian Church had its origin in time; but it lives for evermore with a communicated life that has passed through death. The Christian mystical writers are insistent that the successive events of our Lord's earthly life take place in us perpetually and all at once. We have once been made alive in Christ, and simultaneously rose from death to life in Him, and were made in

Him to sit in heavenly places. So Origen insists that the eternal generation of God the Son is not a single event in an infinitely remote past, but a perpetual activity, an *ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσεως*, to use the phrase of Aristotle. Once slain in time Christ exercises an eternal priesthood in the unending presentation to the Father of Himself in the life that has passed through death. So the Holy Spirit exists in effluence, in influence, in refluent, but essentially in activity as the wind exists only in motion.

Thus the Church in appearance is very different from the Church in reality, a difference due partly to earthly limitations and partly to the sin of its individual members or of groups. It appears divided, imperfect, limited, self-seeking, but it is in reality one with the oneness, holy with the sanctity, catholic with the universality, apostolic with the mission, of Christ. It exists in Him and existed in Him before there were any other members beside Him. What we see at Pentecost is the extension of Him who is being in all fulfilled;* what we are to see at the end is the summing up of all things in Him. In Christ the final and complete salvation is a wrought out thing, to which qualitatively nothing can possibly be added. In Him, as a sample or firstfruits or leader, not only is salvation as a term applicable to human beings an accomplished fact, but the whole created universe has reached its ultimate and designed goal.

To this statement there are certain corollaries. The question for the individual man is how to be taken into Christ, how to remain in Christ, how to be so dominated by Christ that the leaven of His life and spirit may leaven the whole lump. The problem of human life is the problem which Christ solved in His life. Man is to become an instrument of God; but to be wholly and completely an instrument of God demands a perpetual re-enaction of self-giving; the passivity of Calvinism in relation to man is Apollinarianism in relation to Christ. There is no living on the funded store of past graces; the manna must be gathered day by day. We can speak of living in a state of grace, as we can speak of living in the light; but grace is not a static thing, and to live in the light is so to maintain oneself that the light is perpetually striking upon us in a succession of impulses. And the life of Christ is not only not a thing which we can produce by effort; it is not a thing which we can store or own; there is no such thing for men as possessing the Holy Spirit, but only being possessed by Him; Christ is not our property, but we are His by right, and to be His in fact. It is impossible to avoid mixing metaphors, but we grow into His likeness by the continuous and strenuous reflexion of Him

* Eph. i., 23.

who is the Light from the centre of our being through its external expression in words and acts. In our prayers we give voice to His praying in us. Thus the Church is not to be regarded as a storehouse or reservoir of grace, but rather as a system of pipes or channels from which grace issues which is continuously being received. Though in the natural sphere it has the ordinary powers of a human society, in the supernatural it can of itself do nothing, but God working through it does the works. It can, for instance, make new rites and ceremonies, as can the Freemasons; but it cannot make new sacraments. In virtue of its own inherent powers it admits new members into itself, regarded as a human society; but it is God who by His Holy Spirit constantly makes members of Christ, children of God, and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven. If the Church is a mother, she is still a virgin mother.

And this instrumental position of the Church and of its ministry as an organism through which God works, by means of a continuously recommunicated power of life, shews itself also in the matter of dogma. The Church cannot impose on the faithful, as something to which assent is to be demanded, anything which has not been revealed not only as a truth, but as a saving truth. The necessary conditions of salvation exist not by its desires, but by God's determination and ordinance, and those conditions were completely fulfilled by Christ. If we look at the baptismal creeds of the East and West, that is the Constantinopolitan and the so-called Apostles' Creed, we see that after the first "I believe" all the rest proclaims facts on which salvation rests as a matter of fact prior to any declaration; if there were no God, if He were not Creator, if He had not been born and suffered and risen and ascended and been seated at the right hand of the Father; if the Holy Spirit has not been sent and so forth, there would have been for man no eternal life.

I have deliberately left smaller points and secondary issues for discussion. I trust that in what I have said I have not offended either against catholic truth or even individual opinion.

F. J. BADCOCK, D.D.

THE BOLSHEVIST VIEW OF LIFE

If publishers' lists are to be trusted, then one may confidently say that English people are far more ready than they were ten or twelve years ago to give Bolshevism a hearing. Until recently it was only that comparatively small section of our nation that

is already inclined to Communism that was willing to do this. The majority of our people, under the influence of our conservative traditions, and to some extent of our Capitalist Press, has simply turned from Bolshevism as a foul and dangerous madness, involving some sort of atheism of which one need not trouble to enquire the exact nature.

Now, however, the tide of public interest shews signs of turning. Time has lessened the shock of the outrageous cruelties and persecutions of the Russian Revolution's early stages. What is more, time has also given the lie to the confident expectations of the early collapse of the Bolshevist Government. People are saying to themselves that there must be something in a power that has remained stable for nearly twenty years; that has produced social and economic results that are by no means negligible; and which above all has shewn itself capable of evoking in its inner ring of adherents that sort of enthusiasm and willingness for self-sacrifice that hitherto has been associated almost solely with religious causes.

Now the surprise that awaits most English people is this—they will find as they are led to study Bolshevism that they are not confronted with a detached set of social and economic theories. They will find on the contrary that they are brought into contact with the most definite and all-embracing theory of life that has ever appeared since the Christian Faith itself was brought into this world. There is need to stress this point of the strangeness and unexpectedness of the matter to the ordinary intelligent English mind. By the vast majority of our people, not excepting even our clergy, the intimate connection of Bolshevism with anything like a precise underlying view of the Universe is hardly appreciated. There are thousands who know, and possibly approve, some of the principles of Russian Communism who know nothing at all of the philosophy, as distinct from the economic theories, of Karl Marx, and who have no apprehension whatever of the essential connection between the two things. For the English Press has given to us a conception of Bolshevism in which it has seemed to us that its attitude towards religion is a perfectly simple thing to understand. The Bolsheviks have been represented as solely concerned with a social revolution as their only real object. The Orthodox Church was utterly identified with the old order of Czarism and the forces of reaction. Consequently the atheism of the Bolsheviks was supposed to be amply accounted for along a merely practical line. The Church had to be destroyed in order to destroy the State, and the obvious way to procure that end was to proclaim atheism as the official attitude of the new order, and to extirpate as far as possible all vestiges of

religion from the life of the people. In England it is fair to say that that is the ordinary notion of what has been happening; and it is certainly no uncommon thing to hear English people asking whether there is any essential connection between Bolshevism and the denial of God. Is it not at least conceivable that England might go Bolshevik a couple of generations hence, because of the collapse of Capitalism, and yet remain a Christian country, and even that the cause of religion might benefit from the change through being set free from State interference?

Now there may be more than one way of answering that question if it is proposed as a purely abstract one. English people are such past-masters in the art of making a working compromise of irreconcilable factors, especially when religion happens to be one of the factors, that one would hesitate to say dogmatically that they would find anything impossible in that direction. Have we not already achieved a "monarchy"—please note the term "monarchy"—in which we can actually find a place for "His Majesty's Opposition"! But it is quite certain that if one suggested to any Bolshevik leader the possibility of combining his sort of Communism with any kind of belief in God, let alone the Christian faith, he could only see in the proposal a staggering evidence of our total misapprehension of the very essence of what Bolshevism means. For the social system that we call Bolshevism is in the eyes of its founders and propagators the essential and necessary outcome of a philosophy of life the very core of which is the complete exclusion of the whole idea of God. It is not the atheism of Bolshevism but the social system that is dependent. Atheism is the core.

What is not realized in England, but is beginning to be made clear in the books that are now appearing, is that the Bolshevik leaders are not in their own eyes primarily social reformers. That is a position forced on them by the present dominance of Capitalism. But they are in their own estimation first and foremost the prophets, and the only accredited teachers, of a view of the universe, a scheme of metaphysics, a basic philosophy of life, which came into the world as a revelation in Karl Marx, and which can only gain the universal acceptance that they seek for it by the total eradication of the idea of God from the whole human mind. *Bolshevism is quite definitely an atheistic Church*, with a peculiarly well-defined creed applicable to the whole of life and to all its problems, and as a Church it has all the apparatus of inspired writings, an infallible authority, means of excommunicating heretics, and machinery for enforcing not only conformity of conduct, but intellectual acquiescence upon its followers.

Of course the leaders are not so crazy as to expect the present

vast mass of illiterate peasants and artisans to understand all the sacred tenets of the hierarchy; equally of course they have found that the task of obliterating religion is not the work of a moment. You must give time for education to have effect on problems of ignorance and superstition. But meanwhile let there be no mistake about this—admission to, or continuance within, the favoured inner ring of authority or responsibility are made absolutely dependent upon a thorough acceptance not simply of economic tenets but of the whole Marxian-Leninist philosophy of life. Orthodoxy is more rigidly and ruthlessly enforced on all who would enter into the higher grades of service under Bolshevism than ever it was on the ordained priesthood by the Mediæval Church. And the goal that these prelates have in view is not a universal social system in which religion can be left to the individual conscience, but the world-wide acceptance of philosophy which they hold as fanatically as ever a Moslem held the faith of Islam, and which they believe will, when it triumphs, produce a unified humanity, freed from all past hindrances, ready at last to secure the mastery of the universe. Lest that phrase seem extravagant, it may be well to state that it is lifted straight from a Bolshevik writer.

There are not many points on which you will find agreement between such men as Berdyaev, the Christian prophet, and Julius Hecker, the English-speaking apologist of Bolshevism. But on this point they are completely at one. Bolshevism is essentially a Church founded on a certain belief as to the nature of the universe; and in the long run it will stand or fall not by the mere success of its social system, but by the triumph or failure of its creed.

Now before we examine the nature of this creed, let us turn aside briefly to examine a parallel but relevant fact, which is of course common knowledge to us all. It is this:

When you consider the three totalitarian States that are before us at the present day, you perceive that in each case their leaders have realized quite clearly the necessity of fixing upon some one unifying, integrating idea, as a means of evoking enthusiasm among their people for the new order of things. In all three cases these leaders have fixed upon an idea which is not at first sight the kind of idea which one would have thought to be very consonant with the general trend of world-sentiment, and certainly not from our English point of view. But in all three cases this idea has been spread by every conceivable means of authority and propaganda, and has been a conspicuous success from the leaders' point of view as a source of enthusiasm. And yet again in all three cases these ideas seem to the dispassionate outsider to be as unconvincing as they are certainly

dangerous to the peace of the world. Thus the whole German nation is inebriated by that most astonishing ethnological fiction, the purity of the German race—though of course we outsiders know that Germans in general and Prussians in particular are as completely mongrel by descent as we are ourselves, which is saying a good deal. Then, again, any child who has learned anything of mediæval and modern history can only gasp in wonder at the sight of modern Italy prancing in the trappings of the Antonine Empire as though in a robe directly and legitimately inherited.

In estimating, therefore, the claim of Marxian philosophy to be seriously considered as a new revelation of life, we have to take this fact into account and ask how much of its weight is due, not to its inherent value, but to the amazing power and personalities of Marx and Lenin? Lenin saw as plainly as Hitler or Mussolini the necessity of a unifying, integrating idea as a source of enthusiasm. But he had no need to invent one; he already possessed it as the passionate inspiration of his own life. It has at least this merit over those of the other two; it is not a merely national idea, but one that is fundamental to the whole of humanity. Kingdoms and Empires come and go, and the Nazi and Fascist States can be no exception to that rule. But if there is any truth in the old Latin tag "*Veritas prevalebit*," and if by chance the Marxian gospel is truth, then we are in face of an idea compared with which Newtonian physics or Darwinian evolution are mere squibs in the history of human thought. Bolshevism has come to stay and to develop as the great power through long ages of an incalculable future in the history of the world.

The Bolsheviks themselves have no doubt whatever that this is the issue. It is well known that Russians have very little purely national feeling, and their present leaders have little interest in a merely national success. They do not want to set up a State, but to abolish all States, leaving simply the lives of the people based on the Marxian philosophy. Consequently you find, as you would expect to find, that this philosophy is as certain and sacred a thing in Moscow as Mahometanism is in Mecca. Research into the nature and implications of this philosophy is given not merely a definite but the central place in authorized Soviet activities. This work is carried out by a duly appointed body called the "Nameless Collective" because its members work anonymously. Their procedure can quite fairly be described as a sort of "five-year plan in the sector of philosophy." But of course one need hardly say that the fact that the work is organized in this manner is hardly conducive to the progress of any philosophy

at all in the true sense of that word. Obviously there can be no philosophy where there is no freedom of thought, and in the "Nameless Collective" there is none. They are like men walking on a tight-wire and a red-hot one at that. There is one orthodoxy to be observed, and a thousand subtle heresies to be avoided; and the true path of Marxianism as interpreted by Lenin is a very narrow road.

The least divergence from pure doctrine, even on the part of so prominent a practical man of affairs as Trotsky, is attributed not to political difference, but to philosophic unsoundness, and, as in his case, banishment results. There does not seem to be any lack of ability in the members of this "Nameless Collective," this panel, that is to say, of authorized philosophical researchers. On the contrary what they produce shews no small measure of learning and a high degree of scholarship. But the whole thing is so utterly regimented. There is no outpouring of original thought or exercise of individual genius. It is indeed a maxim of the Soviet philosophy that individual brilliance is out of place in modern science; success in the future is held to lie along the line of State-ordering. Consequently what is brought forth is the production of preordained results, reiterated dogma, for the benefit of docile readers and the confusion of heretics.

One cannot help feeling that in all this complaisance on the part of the philosophers themselves there must be a strong element of the peculiar Russian psychology, by which suffering and humiliation at the hands of authority seem to be things that are welcomed. On one occasion Ivan the Terrible, that monstrous tyrant of the sixteenth century, visited a town that had been mildly contumacious; he was accompanied by a long train of torture instruments and expert practitioners. He was received with addresses of welcome, and for a whole fortnight he enjoyed lavish hospitality, often in the houses of prominent citizens who knew quite well that they were to be among the next days' victims. Finally, he left the town amid protestations of affectionate loyalty, leaving behind him an address which began with the words: "My loyal and much loved subjects—that is to say, such of you as are still alive."

Now to us English people freedom of thought is a possession so highly prized that I think we have to find some explanation such as this Russian psychological trait to account for the complaisance of the able minds engaged in this work of fortifying and petrifying Bolshvist orthodoxy. And I think we have seen other evidence of the same thing in those fulsome confessions and pledges of amendment that appear in accounts of O.G.P.U. trials for political offences. Anyway, among the Soviet in-

tellectuals it is an absolute obligation to look upon Lenin as the greatest thinker of modern times, who, with Engels and Stalin, is the only orthodox interpreter of the philosophy of Karl Marx. And when they err, and are chastised, these intellectuals generally shew this same queer tendency to kiss the rod. Lenin certainly does not seem to the outside mind to be by any means a worthy follower, intellectually, of Karl Marx. His interpretations are spasmodic, confused, and self-contradictory. His arguments are often more violent than convincing. Marx, he says, "throws on the dust-heap the idealist swine who defend God." And referring to no less a leader of thought than Hegel he does not hesitate to say, "You felt pity, did you, for this poor little godlet, you idealist swine." But no matter. So complete is the claim of the Soviet system to be totalitarian that philosophy has been made a monopoly of the Government, and intellectual speculation has been confined within an administrative department. And lest the willing compliance of the intellectuals should not be complete there has been set up the whole machinery of informers, spies, and secret reports. A heresy trial, such as that of Deborin, resembles exactly the prosecutions by the O.G.P.U. that we read about in our papers, and the object sought is either the banishment or the voluntary public humiliation of the offending writer who has dared to shew want of reverence for Lenin even by trying to "restate" his views in more modern terms. One most illuminating instance of this is that of the unhappy writer who produced a work upon the origins of religion. A complaint was immediately lodged against him that he had made no reference to Lenin's views on totemism and magic. It availed the author hardly at all that he was able to reply truthfully that in all his writings Lenin had made no mention of these things. He was forced through all the humiliation of a public recantation. If this sort of thing is possible among the intellectuals we need no longer wonder at the grovelling apologies made by political offenders. Here clearly we are in the presence not simply of a philosophy, but rather of a perverted but all powerful Church with a perverted religion.

So then we come to the question what in fact is this sacred philosophy that lies within the ark of the Soviet Covenant? Whether or not we think it a credible scheme of metaphysics, we must admit that as it appears at Moscow it has at least the merit of being very precisely defined. It is called "Dialectical Materialism," and it abhors not only theism, but with an equal violence idealism, agnosticism, scepticism, positivism, and most of all that "mechanicalism" that we in England generally know as "materialism."

There comes in the rather abstruse point that we must grasp before we can have any effective comprehension of the philosophy. The Bolsheviks cling most fanatically to that term "Materialism," because they want to make it quite clear that their philosophy does not belong in any way to the "idealist" group.

Any philosophy must start from one of two standpoints. You may assert the primacy of consciousness over being; that existence is inconceivable apart from perceiving mind. If so, then you proceed along some sort of idealist line. Or you may assert the primacy of being over consciousness. You may say that consciousness exists only because things exist. If you do that, then according to the Bolshevik you must be a materialist, for the simple reason that to him the material is the only real. He dismisses with contempt the whole notion that, by believing the material to be a manifestation of the spiritual, you may be a realist, as most Christians are, without being a materialist at all. If you do that, then the holy voice of Lenin proclaims you to be not a realist but merely a swine. In the Marx-Leninist philosophy the first dogma is that real and material are wholly synonymous terms, for the simple reason that nothing exists but matter and functions of matter.

That is all simple enough. But now comes in what is the chief crux for our benighted English minds. "Materialism" involves for us some sort of mechanicalism, for not otherwise can we conceive of the movement of sheer matter. But the outlook of the Marxian philosophy is very different. It starts, as we have seen, with the prime dogma that nothing but the material can possibly exist, and it then goes on at once to assert that within matter there exists the "dialectical" process by which all the movement, change, growth, emergence of qualities that you can observe in all the universe are amply accounted for. The root of the matter is this: matter is not a merely inert thing subject only to mechanical energy to push it about. There is within all matter the stress of the tension of opposite principles; which stress *creates* interior energy so that the material world is a world of autodynamism. That is to say that because of this "dialectical" tension of opposite principles you have within the material world itself all causality as a property of matter itself.

We must now try to define the meaning of this word "dialectical." It comes, of course, from the Greek word that signifies a discussion. It came to the front in modern thought as a description of the philosophic method of Hegel. One man states a position which is called a "thesis." His hearer then presents a body of contrary arguments called the "antithesis." But then, if both are seeking truth and not merely an argu-

mentative victory, it will be found that some part of the thesis is demolished, and some arguments of the antithesis are valid. By a reconsideration, therefore, of the ground both disputants are led to form a new position known as the "synthesis." This synthesis may obviously be taken over into a new discussion in which it becomes the thesis. Thus philosophic thought is built up by a repetition of the process.

Now in the Marxian philosophy the Idealism of Hegel is wholly rejected, and Materialism takes its place. But Hegel's dialectic method is retained. It is assumed, and it is of the utmost importance to notice that this first step is one of sheer assumption, that apart altogether from mental process this dialectical movement is taking place in matter. Examine any part of the material world and it will be found that matter presents a thesis. This automatically produces an antithesis in its environment, and a state of tension is the result. This tension is resolved by the inevitable production of a synthesis; which synthesis itself becomes a new thesis, and so the whole story of evolution is carried out by the endless repetition in the sphere of Nature itself of this dialectical process. Think of a lump of ice. There is a dialectical tension between the formation of the ice-crystals and the temperature of the surrounding atmosphere. A struggle is set up by which not merely a quantitative change takes place but a qualitative one. The properties of ice are lost and the properties of water take their place. There you have the whole story of evolution, from protoplasm to the most intricate affairs of the human mind and of modern social life. There is no need of any first cause or the operation of any superior or external power. The "autodynamism" of matter carries you the whole way; and it is simply a question of realizing the holy secret that matter is not the mechanical thing working, as the earlier materialists supposed, by fixed laws towards some given end. Matter is the sphere of this "dialectical" process by which out of the strains and stresses of opposites and of conflicting principles new states of being are constantly emerging. This is the key to understanding all stages of the process of evolution; and it is a key which must never be let go of in the attempt to solve any problem whatsoever. In particular we must remember that all ideas in the human mind are simply the outcome of stresses caused by material needs. Man's history is in fact nothing but the story of man's economics. The present unrest of the world is just the inevitable result of the dialectical strain between the capitalist system and its self-created environment. The only solution is the emergence in world-wide Communism of the qualities of life necessarily engendered by the dialectical process.

Now in Soviet Russia, among intellectuals, this rather difficult philosophy simply has taken the place of religion and seems for a time to be satisfying the needs which hitherto religion has met. Matter ceases to be the instrument of anything above it, and becomes itself the be-all and end-all of existence. Owing to the dialectical process of which it is the sphere, matter takes on in man such properties as thought and reason, purpose and endeavour. And the one really strong point about Marxism is its refusal to separate thought from action. There is no such thing as "pure thought." You cannot know anything about dialectical Materialism as a theory of the universe unless you are actively engaged in proving it by building up the Soviet State. This is doubtless one reason why Bolsheviks seem to find it so easy to believe that the higher properties of matter are what we should call spiritual, except that the term with them has no connection with the Christian ideas of the Divine and the Eternal. And there is nothing whatever relative or mysterious about this wonderful universe to which we are thus introduced. Scepticism is as out of place as is religion. The Absolute not only exists but is knowable, for the Material is the Absolute. The Absolute is nothing else but matter in motion in space and time because of its own inherent autodynamism, and therefore there is nothing about it that we cannot know or define.

Now lest it should be thought that all this is a mere parody of an opponent's position, it would be well to quote from the apology of Julius Hecker. He tells us that "The conflict of Soviet Communism with religion is more than a political struggle. It is a conflict of two philosophies, and therefore of two types of culture." He then goes on to assure us that Nature is potentially endowed with the attribute of spirit which emerges into consciousness in the process of development. This also implies that the universe never was created. It is eternal, real, independent and prior to human consciousness. This hypothesis, he says, "leaves no room for God, the Creator, existing independent of and prior to Nature. Dialectical philosophy has no place for God in the Christian sense, nor for a supernatural world prior to this world. Atheism, therefore, in the Communist sense does not mean the denial of spiritual quality with which organized matter is endowed, and which therefore must be accepted as part of reality. It means only the rejection of a supernatural world and of a God or Gods existing prior to and independent of Nature."

Now when you get this philosophy safely out of Moscow it is easy enough to criticize it. Space of course only permits that it should be done here in a very general sort of way. But most

of us would probably agree that we cannot see that here is any really coherent philosophical system at all. It is a mere series of assumptions of fundamental things and a begging of question after question. For instance, the illustration of ice provides a rather ingenious explanation of quantitative change becoming qualitative change; but it leaves absolutely untouched the whole question of what is a value, what is the criterion of values, and the reason for estimating one higher than another. Philosophic details, however, can be very wearisome; so we may go at once to the main point, which is surely this: whatever may be said for the dialectical method as a method, Marxian materialism is not materialism at all. It is strictly speaking "Holo-zoism"—that is to say, the attribution to the sum total of matter of all the attributes of life, by a sheer initial assumption. Then of course, having made that assumption, it is easy to attribute to matter everything you wish in the way of power of movement, growth, and development. But there is nothing new in all this. It is simply a crude form of Pantheism with the idea of divinity reduced to a mere life-principle. And as Pantheism it needs no introduction to us. The Church has met it already in every age of its existence, and has long been familiar with all the appropriate arguments that can be used against it. It closes no questions. It merely brings materialism round the full cycle and opens again all the old problems of causes and origins and values to which we have long believed there is no answer except only God.

Undeniably the Marxian creed and the Atheist Church have at present a powerful strangle-hold on Russia. The question is, how long is it likely to last? There are at least two weighty reasons for believing that it cannot be permanent, and can never become really that basis of a new civilization that Lord Passfield seems to expect.

The first reason is its completely unsatisfactory and very curious attitude towards science. It claims of course that science is its instrument; that under its guidance life in the future will be moulded by science as it was in the past by religion. But in fact it is pegged down in the strangest way to certain outworn scientific ideas of the last century; and is not merely blind to, but impatient of, some of the most important movements of modern scientific thought. It is very odd, but it is a fact, that it is actually the younger Soviet philosophers who most energetically proclaim that they do not want any attempt to approximate Marxian ideas to modern science. But it seems quite plain to the onlooker that modern physics is tending in a direction that is utterly contrary to Marxian teaching and is sapping its very foundations. The main point can be quite

shortly and easily stated. Nils Bohr, whom we may fairly regard as the greatest living physicist, says that it is impossible to comprehend the phenomena of life by means of the concepts of classical physics—that is to say, the physics of last century. But of course the very first assumption of Marxism is that life is included in the classical concepts of physics. It is quite obvious that some Marxian writers perceive this danger and are growing not only nervous but irritated. They are profoundly angry with men like Eddington and Jeans. Hecker in particular has a lot to say as to the possibility that the newer views of physics will open the way for a return of religion. He uses language in regard to this so unorthodox from the Marxian point of view that one wonders whether he will have the courage ever to return to Moscow.

Then, secondly, and perhaps not less importantly, it may be held that the Bolshevik Church has fundamentally misinterpreted human nature. Certainly the enthusiasm and self-sacrifice that they evoked for the early stages of the Revolution were very remarkable. But one wonders, and evidently some of their writers wonder, what is going to happen later on. After all, you cannot make men spend all their lives in a factory or on a collective farm; and you cannot keep their whole attention glued to economic theories and the prospects of a five-year plan. You cannot permanently inhibit them, that is to say, from the ordinary experiences that are common to our mortal lot—experiences of love and hope, of joy and sorrow, death and bereavement, temptation, disappointment, weariness and pain. Nor can you shut out of their sight the stars and interstellar space, or hide from them the manifold evidence of the mysteries of life. It is surely these common experiences, and not artificial theories imposed from above, that must in the end determine life's outlook, and which awaken the needs of soul-hunger that only religion can meet. It is the old story that you find in Browning's "Bishop Blougram's Apology." You fashion to yourself a philosophy of life that seems intellectually sound; the whole thing gets upset by "a sunset or someone's death." And even Lord Passfield's book (*Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*) is not wholly bare of signs in those statistics of which he is so fond that seem to shew that even now in Russia the tide of religion may be turning to flow back into the void that the arid reasoning of Marx and Lenin can never fill.

As for us in England, one cannot think that there is any present danger of this dialectical materialism being widely accepted as a coherent scheme explaining life. But there is danger of it becoming a serious hindrance in the sort of way that mechan-

ical evolution or Freudianism have already shown to be possible. We clergy in England have to deal increasingly neither with the very simple nor the really learned, but with that heart-breaking thing the half-educated mind. And there are all round us thousands of clever young men, who have been technically instructed and think they have been educated, and who are ready enough to accept *any* view of life contrary to the Christian view. They are vaguely aware that the old-fashioned mechanical materialism has broken down. It is no longer up-to-date to be a materialist in the old sense. To such people a smattering of the Marxian ideas now being so vigorously propagated will be a very dangerous thing, because it will afford them an easy way out—a way in which they can retain all their self-complacency and intellectual conceit, without having to go under the Caudine Forks of admitting again a spiritual interpretation of life.

We must try to fit ourselves to meet these ideas as they appear and develop among our people. We cannot all be expert philosophers; few of us, I suppose, have the time to embark upon anything like a close study of the Marxian philosophy. But it is essential that we should at least keep our minds absolutely and uncompromisingly clear upon the fundamental issue that is involved, and which has been admirably stated by Berdyaev:

"Two attitudes," he says, "two completely divergent positions, are possible for man; and he finds the face of everything different accordingly as he chooses the one or the other. He can, if he will, put himself in the presence of God and the mystery of being. Then he has a clear conscience and a clean heart; revelation and intuition are vouchsafed to him, the true primordial creativeness appears, and he reaches to the very source of all.

"On the other hand, man can, if he will, put himself only in the presence of other men and with society. Then his conscience and his heart cannot be pure, revealed truth is changed, religion is reduced to a social fact, the light of intuition goes out and the glow of creation is cooled, and falsehood comes into its own and is recognized as socially useful and even indispensable. Man, whether conservative or revolutionary, is valued only in relation to the social routine and can no longer attain to the ultimate source. . . . The Marx-Leninist never puts himself in the presence of God and the mystery of being, but always and only in the presence of other men and of society. That is why he has no revelations and no intuitions. . . . This orientation towards Man and estrangement from the First Cause produce a charlatanism which can be perfectly sincere and loyal in

individuals, in more or less all parties, schools, and sects. It provides a psychological problem of very great interest. In the Marx-Leninist philosophy this charlatanism, honest and even capable of self-sacrifice, is carried to its perfection, it becomes a sacred duty. [But it is in essence an enslavement of the soul] for freedom can come only from submission to God and to the mystery of being."

ALAN H. SIMPSON.

BURIED ALIVE

THE editorials of a leading theological journal have recently noticed with sympathetic interest the existence of some queer people called "rural priests," or "country parsons." It appears that they lead a "hard and lonely life," and that they have reason sometimes to be depressed. It may, therefore, be worth while to set out in detail some of the conditions of these men, and to see if their lot and their conduct do really deserve the judgments passed upon them.

There is still a considerable number of old-fashioned country clergy, drawn from upper and middle class homes, men of public school and university education, with sufficient, if not ample, means. But as they die, these men are being replaced by priests from a class which is new to the countryside; and it is these younger men who are really meant when the intelligentsia speak in contempt of the country clergy. Of recent years many priests of lower-middle class origin and upbringing have gone out from curacies in town parishes to be incumbents in the country. They have entered a social circle to which they have been quite unused. There are hardly any lower-middle class people in a village, and the assumptions of town life do not hold good beyond the urban boundaries. The new vicar is an alien, who knows nothing at all of what can and cannot be done in his new parish. He must learn his trade afresh from the beginning. He must study the seasons and their appropriate labours, with a view to arranging suitable times for his evangelistic campaigns and his efforts to raise money, and he must be ready to alter the hours of Services to suit the conditions of rural labour. He will be wise if he grasps the fact that his parishioners are closely interrelated and intermarried, and he will master the details of these connections as quickly as possible. The rural priest must allow for long distances and the effect of hard manual labour on health and character. Above all, he must learn to understand

the land, with its power of absorbing men's affections and energies until it becomes their God.

A very important feature of the life of the poorer rural priest is the large element in it of manual labour. This is also a feature of the poorer town priest's life, but in the towns the houses are better equipped with labour-saving devices, the garden work is much less, and shops and schools are nearer. The rural priest probably undertakes to live in a house of a dozen or more rooms, with a garden of a couple or more acres of land and £300 to £400 a year in cash. There will be one maid, often a "daily," and perhaps a man or boy for a day or so in the garden each week. The priest will have to do a good deal of housework and gardening himself. He will light the fires, clean the flues, pump the water, clean the boots, wash up, clean and drive the car, nurse the children, go shopping, fetch in coals, dig the kitchen garden, tend the fowls, paint and paper the rooms, mow the lawn, take the children to school, trim the hedges, sweep up the leaves, and many other odd jobs. In his church he may have to light and tend the fires for Sunday and keep the brass clean with his own hands. It is the priest's duty to clear up the sweet wrappers and set the church straight on Monday mornings. A competent priest will be able to scrub the floors and be handy with electric fittings and trowel and mortar.

The first effects of this manual labour are bad. The labourers at once see that the Vicarage now supplies employment for one person instead of five or six, and grumble accordingly. The farmers find it hard to respect a man whose home conditions are no grander than their own. The gentry will miss the social intercourse on terms of mutual invitation which they used to enjoy with the Vicarage people, and complain bitterly that the Vicar ignores them. The refusal of clergy to take part in party politics is resented, and is often ascribed, quite erroneously, to Labour sympathies, a deadly sin among country gentry. The people at the Hall are inclined to treat a poor priest with a rude condescension very galling to a proud spirit, though a good opportunity for the practice of Christian humility. But before long the benefits of the manual labour begin to appear. The priest will find that it keeps his body healthy and prevents his manners from becoming too genteel. He will begin to feel a deeper sympathy with housewives and servants, and his garden will help him to enter into the spirit of the land. Indeed, the amount of labour is decreasing: some of us now have electric pumps, and our sons are getting old enough to mow the lawn. It is true that a few are overburdened, but the superior clergy make a great mistake when they deplore our poverty, which is after all only a fall from an upper-middle

class to a lower-middle class status. Some of us are even tempted to think of the dignitaries, with their soft white hands and their smart clothes, as rather namby-pamby.

Then, the rural priest is almost entirely free from supervision. He need hardly ever see his Bishop, except to shake hands in a crowded vestry at a Confirmation. Cathedral dignitaries he probably never meets at all. He will listen to an annual Charge from his Archdeacon, but otherwise he will hardly ever see him. There are, indeed, Diocesan gatherings in the form of lectures and quiet days, but they are not compulsory. Any correspondence with the higher officials usually begins with the incumbent, except in the case of demands for the quota.

The effects of this freedom are bad, and it is a source of the weakness of our Church. The wings of genius are, no doubt, left unclipped. But genius is rare at any level of life, and many priests fall into slack ways from not being kept up to their duties. The rural priest is apt to feel that the authorities do not care and only regard him as a nuisance. After a time, however, he begins to look upon his isolation as a precious right with which no one must interfere. If the Bishop does at long last descend upon him with orders to do this or that, or, what is more likely, to desist from doing it, the priest often resents what seems an encroachment upon his liberty and an insult to his dignity; and so refuses to obey, or obeys grudgingly, what may be in itself a very proper command. Clashing colours of Churchmanship and differences of social training exacerbate the division. The recovery of discipline in our Church will need something much more far-reaching than mere changes in the law.

In a rural parish most of the "Church work" will devolve upon the Vicar and his wife, and he must be ready to turn his hand to any department of it, over and above what we generally include in the cure of souls and the work of evangelism. It would be wise if every prospective rural priest learned to play the organ well enough to accompany services and took a course in choir training. But besides "Church work" the rural priest will probably have to undertake a good deal of secular public work. He must expect to act as the agent of the Local Education Authority in his villages, whether the schools are "provided" or "non-provided." He will soon begin to see that the value of a "Church" school is not that the Church gains anything out of it, but that it affords the Church a rather larger opportunity for service to Education. Then there are the Parish Council, the District Council, the Guardians' Committee, and perhaps even the County Council. The priest will find the work of these bodies most interesting, and he will often be able to

use his membership of them as a means of being helpful to farmers and others in the parishes with whom he would otherwise have little contact. These bodies also shew the country gentry at their best and afford a chance of contact with Free Churchmen.

There is in all this no encroachment on the time set apart for devotion and study. The country church is at its best when it is empty of all but the one worshipper, the priest saying Morning and Evening Prayer. The Sunday Eucharist, early in the day, with a handful of toil-stained communicants whom the priest knows to be there at real cost to themselves, is beautiful beyond description with the Presence of God. As for study, the County Library will supply any books the priest needs, often going far afield to get them from other libraries. A rural priest need never lack books. He may air his learning before the local Clerical Society in "Papers." Indeed, inter-vicarage friendship is a marked feature of the rural ministry, and one which is of great spiritual help.

Supposing, then, that the rural priests set themselves to live this kind of life, what response may they expect from their people? Country people are not so wicked as the novelists make out. They will respond to the Christian appeal as well as they are able. Their poor education handicaps them, and the fact that there is a terrible publicity in a village makes religious effort difficult. Also, the land is a power always drawing those who work on it down to the lower levels of nature-worship. The countryman finds spiritual realities hard to grasp, and Churchmanship is too often confused with party politics. Hodge is awkward in ceremonial, and his musical powers are pitifully small. His arduous labour leaves him tired at week-ends, and unable to give close attention for long periods to an act of worship. He finds the Prayer Book difficult to understand, and the sermon may all too often be over his head. In recent times there are also the distractions of easy transport and "wireless," which make against churchgoing on Sundays. But at the same time there is a faithful devotion to the Church and her worship, which springs out of a true and deep Christian belief. Country people will give generously to causes which appeal to them, and the fabric and the beautifying of the parish churches are among those causes. On great occasions the churches are filled, and even in times of spiritual disaster to the priest there is always a faithful remnant to keep the faith alive until better times come.

When a priest is calculating the gains and losses of his work in a rural parish, he may easily overlook two important considerations. The first is, that he must stop a good many years

in the place if he is to consolidate his work. The country moves slowly at any time. The new priest, with his town upbringing and his citified ways and speech, is hard for Hodge to understand. The "Catholic and critical" outlook is very new to him, and therefore he is suspicious of it. It cuts across so many traditions in a world where traditions are overwhelmingly strong, and it will be a long time before the tide turns. Many priests have left their rural parishes a year or two years too soon, and because they did not finish their work they did not see the results, and felt themselves, quite erroneously, to be failures.

The other point to be considered is that the rural clergy do a valuable preventive work. No one can live long on the land without becoming aware of its powerful and uncanny fascination for the imagination. All the experiences which give rise to nature-worship come as a matter of course to dwellers in the country side, and the practices which belong to these lower levels of religion are not really forgotten. Superstition is not dead, but only driven underground; and it is the priest, with his higher religious belief and conduct, who more than any other keeps it underground. Much of the old nature-worship was, and is, quite harmless; but there is a darker side, and the preventive force of a man who stands for the free Spirit of God in learning and conduct has a real value and a beneficial effect. If the parish priests were withdrawn from the countryside its tone would soon degenerate.

There may be easier positions in the world and in the Church than that of the incumbent of one of the poorer country benefices. But he has security of tenure, plenty of varied work to do, the beauty of the countryside, a good wife, and the Divine Grace to help him. No one need pity him.

J. W. PARKER.

THE LOGIC OF BIRTH CONTROL

AMONG the problems which have arisen in the social state since the War there is probably none that has caused so much widespread dissension among Christian people as the problem of birth control. This problem, however, only becomes acute when the various methods of birth control are discussed, and there is something to be said for those who maintain that "conceptive control" would be the right name for this controversy rather than birth control; but, in view of the fact that the problem of limiting the family is at the back of the whole subject,

I think that it would be more practical to discuss the subject of birth control in general. For I am convinced that there is a logic in this problem that is far too often overlooked in the dangerous heat of controversy; a logic which while definitely on one side in the controversy will force all others into its service before the end—by reason of its moral cogency.

Now it may be admitted outright that society as a whole—Christian and secular—has agreed that birth control of some kind must be practised if we are not to plunge ourselves into economic disaster. Moreover, no branch of the Church has ever objected to it on principle. The almost universal celibacy of the Roman Catholic priesthood, the monastic system in the Eastern Orthodox Churches and the high regard which the whole Church has always paid to the vocation to virginity, are all instances which implicitly involve birth control. This is not nearly so widely recognized as it should be; but the undisputed fact remains that the traditional view of the Catholic Church has been that birth control may be practised by one means only—that of continence. There is no reason why the most ultra-montane Roman Catholic couple should not limit their family in this way; and, of course, that is what is often done.

There are, however, other communions whose authorities, in certain circumstances, allow birth control to be practised by artificial means; and Resolution 15 of the 1930 Lambeth Conference can certainly be interpreted in this light. Of course the Bishops made it clear that the procreation of children was always to be the end kept in view by married couples, and that birth control for selfish or indulgent reasons was a sin; but, without straining at the terminology, it is equally clear that their lordships contemplated the limiting of families by artificial means in certain circumstances, and gave their blessing to this procedure. The fact that a large minority in the English Church felt betrayed by this attitude has not prevented the majority from rejoicing at it; and, quite rightly from their point of view, the vendors of contraceptive instruments have made the most of it.

Before criticizing what may roughly be called the Lambeth View it would be as well to see what gave rise to it and to what extent, if any, it may be justified. I suppose nobody would deny that the decision was revolutionary—particularly in view of the pronouncements upon the subject at the 1920 Conference; but economic pressure has greatly increased since 1920; and the Bishops were anxious that hard cases should not be made harder than was necessary. Such an argument depends upon its validity for what we mean by "necessary." The frustration of a natural law by artificial means might be considered a

necessity if a higher natural law, or a supernatural law, were served by so doing; but what we have yet to learn is that the mutual satisfaction of husband and wife in sexual intercourse—(a highly desirable and happy thing to achieve)—is observing a higher law than God's law for the bringing of immortal souls to birth. The Bishops would, I imagine, be the last people to make such a claim explicitly; but their sanction of birth control by artificial means does violate a supernatural law in order that a subsidiary and natural one shall be fulfilled.

Their appeal to the threefold benefits of marriage as vindicated by the Book of Common Prayer will not, I think, bear investigation. For nowhere does the Prayer Book claim that all three are of the same importance; and even less does it suggest that they can in any way be divided. It states, without any ambiguity, that marriage was ordained for three purposes: the procreation of children, avoidance of sin, and the fostering of love between man and wife. One of these is supernatural, one purely negative, and one natural in its operation. The Lambeth View holds logically that the natural and negative conditions may, in certain circumstances, annul the supernatural: an attitude which I have no hesitation in calling revolutionary. It is a concession to human frailty brought about, I am glad to admit, by human sympathy; but one which would have been regarded with horror in the more robust days of the Church.

I maintain, however, that if we test the logic of the situation created at Lambeth in 1930 we shall discover that the Bishops unwittingly opened the door to all kinds of wrongs and abuses that may be justified by the logical application of their pronouncement. In order to do this we must recognize the foundations upon which that pronouncement was based. It was affirmed that families might be limited by other means than continence in the case of those married couples who, for economic reasons, could not have children; and this was justified on the plea that it would not be right to stifle *all* the conditions of nature because it was impossible to achieve the most important one. There are needs of the human body which nature can fulfil in marriage without the procreation of children; and these needs might be met—even if the ideal of marriage was to be frustrated. In plain terms an economic necessity could make B right when A was unobtainable; and I propose to press this analogy to its logical conclusion—shewing that C, D and E are conditions only waiting to be fulfilled when the one before them has, for various reasons, proved itself unobtainable.

It would be absurd, for instance, to claim that families are the only things that have to be limited in times of economic pressure. There are other concerns, even in the sexual life of

men and women, which come into the same category for the same reason. We all know that it is impossible for the majority of middle class men and women to marry before thirty; and that the economic condition of the country is largely responsible for this fact. Marriages under thirty are, among the comfortable classes, comparatively rare; but does this mean that the Church is to revise its normal law of marriage to meet this condition? In the light of the Lambeth View on birth control I cannot see how the Church can logically refuse to do so. Once the principle is admitted that you must not deny nature her right merely because the supernatural end in view is unobtainable I do not see where or why we are going to draw the line.

Let us look at the matter from a practical standpoint. Here are a young man and young woman wishing to marry. That, they admit, is the ideal; but, in view of their economic circumstances, that ideal is unrealizable. Nevertheless, the natural law urges them to cohabit, and are they or are they not to forgo obedience to that natural law while the supernatural relationship of marriage remains impossible? There cannot be the slightest doubt as to what the Bishops, individually or collectively, would reply to this; but could such a reply be justified by their attitude to birth control? Such a couple as I have in mind would certainly claim that, according to the Lambeth View, they have a right to express the natural at the expense of the supernatural when the latter state does not come within the realm of practical possibility.

For the flaw in the Lambeth View is making the natural rather than the supernatural the ideal, and in granting that the supernatural may be sacrificed to the natural when emergency demands it. There is much to be said for this attitude from the humanist standpoint, and a religion could be made out of it; but it would not be the religion of Jesus Christ. It is the logical conclusion of that type of protestantism against which puritanism was a revolt: a type very usual on the Continent at the time of the Reformation and in England under Edward VI. and Elizabeth, and against which the late Baron von Hügel argued so relentlessly, and that confused the supernatural with the unnatural, and regarded celibacy and the monastic systems as sub-Christian. The Catholic religion has always maintained that nature must be hallowed by supernatural use, and that to indulge nature at the expense of the supernatural is a sin that must bring its own consequences.

There are other abuses which, once the procreation of children is ruled out of the marriage law, may logically come into their heritage. We have already seen that those to whom marriage is denied may, in the logic of the Lambeth View, fairly expect

to be allowed to cohabit without the marriage-tie, providing that the birth of children is prevented; but what is to be said in the case of those who are not ready to marry? An adolescent boy and girl are generally regarded as unfit to choose a partner for life; but Nature knows nothing of this. She provides them with a powerful sexual urge which, if not gratified in a normal or abnormal way, only too often ends in the habit of masturbation being formed.

Now every Bishop on the bench knows that this is so, and realizes that experienced priests in all parts of the Church are constantly dealing with this situation. For the supernatural law of the Christian religion demands a sacrifice here as in so many other cases. Boys and girls are constantly and rightly reminded that, in such a habit, they are abusing a gift which was bestowed upon them for a single purpose, the procreation of children; and, as always, the Church demands that the sexual instinct shall be denied in any form until its supernatural end can be achieved. It may be argued, however, that according to the Lambeth View, as expressed in that fatal resolution, the adolescent has a right to express the promptings of nature so long as the supernatural end in view cannot be obtained. For why should a man and woman be allowed to express this instinct by a deliberate frustration of the supernatural end for which they believe it to have been created, and the hungry adolescent forced to starve himself or herself because, in the act of masturbation, they would be compensating for a natural act which they may not perform?

This problem must really be faced; and it had better be faced in all its unashamed nakedness. Those who advocate birth control by artificial means are, if they are going to be consistent, opening the door to a flood of sexual abuses; and I have only mentioned two of them. Needless to say, such a state of affairs would be viewed from Lambeth with the utmost dismay; and, as I have already said, the Bishops have in other ways done what they can to prevent them; but is their attitude consistent? What is given with one hand is taken away by the other. No wonder those in the Church who take their stand with the minority feel that they have been betrayed!

The logic of the Lambeth View begins with the false assumption that, if you cannot achieve an ideal, you may violate one of the means by which that ideal is achieved, and that it is an end in itself. Instances could be multiplied to shew in what a chaos such a system of thought would ultimately involve us, and we have only to consider the various abuses of food and drink among those who isolate the enjoyment of them from the end for which they are intended to realize some of these; but the

impositions of space demand that I shall keep the argument within the bounds of one problem. There is, however, one aspect of it that is so important, and which so blatantly vindicates the flaw in the logic of the Lambeth View, that it may well be given before I bring this article to a close.

Now we all know that in the world at large, and in schools and universities to an acute degree, the problem of homosexuality and homosexual relationships is one that calls for moral and sympathetic treatment. There is a minority, probably larger than is generally supposed, who suffer from a permanent frustration of this kind in their sexual life, but whose minds and bodies demand just as much expression for the sexual instinct as do those of more normally constituted people. There is only one answer, so far as I can see, that the Christian moralist can give to these people. That is the Christian view that the sexual instinct is given to us for the continuance of the human race in order that it may be increased and multiplied to the day of the coming of the Kingdom of God, and that its use for any other purpose is an abuse.

It is, however, impossible for the Lambeth View on birth control to be squared with this uncompromising attitude; and it is not unlikely that those who are suffering from sexual abnormality will endeavour to justify the satisfaction of their sexual life by an appeal to this view. On the assumption that normal sexual intercourse seems unnatural and abhorrent to them—(a fact not universally recognized among those of normal sex desires)—they will claim that, since the sexual act can be justified as an end in itself, the burden of their sexual life should be removed by permission to indulge it with others, or at least with one other, of their own kind.

It would not be difficult to square such an appeal with the logic of the Lambeth View. We have seen that, according to that view, the procreation of children is the ideal; but that this ideal may be forgone in the case of those who, for practical reasons, do not wish to have children, because the satisfaction of the sex instinct is something that may be, in such cases, treated independently. Since homosexual persons can realize their sex life only in relation to another of their own sex, it may be claimed by them that Lambeth has, by the isolation of the sexual act from the purposes of procreation, sanctioned the homosexual relationships. Even if it be claimed that Lambeth has nowhere sanctioned sexual relationships outside the marriage bond, I can claim that this argument has already shewn that, according to the logic of this view, sexual relationships may be enjoyed outside the marriage bond when marriage proves impracticable.

Of course, the Bishops would again here be horrified by such a view; but can such horror be called consistent in view of the logical implications of Resolution 15? Once you isolate the sexual act from the purposes for which God intended it, and justify it as an end in itself, the New Morality comes into its own. For it is no exaggeration to say that this is one of its bulwarks—is, in fact, *the* bulwark of its sexual ethic. Mr. Middleton Murry said some years ago that he could not see any argument for the use of contraceptives that should not be equally well applied to homosexual relationships; and I am astonished that this perfectly logical and consistent view of the situation has not gained more ground than it has. For both are based upon the pagan belief in man's right to satisfy his sexual instincts without reference to any plan which God may have in accordance with it, and the logical conclusions deduced therefrom.

It is instructive to reflect upon the fact that the Lambeth Conference of 1920 adopted an entirely uncompromising attitude towards birth control, and admitted that continence was the only method which Christianity could allow. The change of front has undoubtedly come about owing to the economic condition of the last ten years and the increased difficulties of supporting a family. While applauding the humanitarian motive of such a change of attitude it is impossible not to be greatly dismayed by it. For it means that a situation has only got to become hard enough for a wrong to become a right; and this strikes at the very root of Christian moral principle and the finality of Truth. The revival of humanism outside the Church is a cause for congratulation. It is accomplishing much that is good; but if Christianity is going to whittle away its own dogmas in order to meet it half-way, it is going to be a most disastrous business.

From time to time one hears it said that what the Churches need is to be persecuted again; and, while this often assumes the nature of a gibe, it is impossible to deny its truth. Persecution may be a terrible purge, but it separates the gold from the dross. It is at such times that a mere humanism shrivels up and Christianity is found to vindicate itself in uncompromising terms. We may all hope and pray to be delivered from it in this country and this age; but we have only to look at the days of the Church's persecution to see how stark and how real its system of ethics was. There was no room for humanism or a pleading of hard cases when the block, the stake and the fangs of wild beasts were the price one paid for membership of the Church.

I paint this rather lurid picture in its true colours because

I hope that it will bring home to us the suicidal method of allowing humanitarian considerations to turn a wrong into a right or even to allow an ideal to be worn down. For we are told again and again, by people in high places, that if we knew the squalor and the misery in which multitudes of people live as a result of overcrowding, we should consider it our Christian duty to advocate birth control by any means. My answer to that is the answer that I should have thought must be patent to every Christian: that whatever the squalor and the misery, if the cure means the frustration of a Divine Law, it is a sin; and that we may not employ what is wrong to gain what is right. It would be casting out Satan by Beelzebub.

For who can doubt the appalling miseries and sufferings of the early Church? After the first few generations of persecution every Christian became the natural heir to unspeakable danger, torments and all kinds of deaths. Parents witnessed their daughters outraged by their executioners, children were deprived of their parents; and everywhere a state of terror reigned for those who professed and called themselves Christians—a state to which no end was in sight. By sprinkling a little incense before the Emperor's bust the whole Christian community, or any of its members, could have gained emancipation. Our modern humanitarian Christian is bound, if he is logical—as indeed some would plead that, in order to escape all this pain and misery, the Christian would have been justified in sacrificing to the Emperor. Yet, if he had, where would Christianity be today—would it be anywhere at all?

Luckily for us the early Church could never have supposed that the suffering of its members could make the slightest difference to what was right and what was wrong, but realized that men and women might be called upon to face death, and worse than death, for the sake of an ideal. Such a spectacle may well make the Church today ask itself whether any conditions, however terrible, can give it the right to sacrifice an ideal. The problem of the poor—their slums and their overcrowding—should wound the conscience of every Christian who is a member of the society which has tolerated them; but the way out is not the easy escape from responsibility engendered by artificial birth control. It is by an example of self-control and a reorganization of society that will make slums and grinding poverty an impossibility. The early Christians pleaded with their persecutors, and did what they could to alleviate suffering; but they did not offer incense at the Emperor's bust to save their sons and daughters from torture and death. That is a terrible lesson to us.

There has probably never been a time before in which men

and women have been actuated by such genuinely humanitarian motives as they are today, and the Divine Law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," has probably never been practised on so wide a scale; but the humanism which is abroad, and which has partly accounted for this change, has got into Christianity; and Christian moral conduct in the twentieth century is apt to go no farther than the humanism which is flourishing outside the Christian Church. There is another Divine Law which our Lord put first, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God"; and obedience to His Laws comes before the consideration of our neighbour.

This has a direct bearing upon the problem of birth control. For we must make up our mind whether we are going to be uncompromising witnesses to the law of God, who, all Christians admit, has given us the means of bringing immortal souls to birth by using His gift to that end; or whether we are going, by artificial means, deliberately to frustrate its supernatural end in order to satisfy our natural instincts. A majority of Bishops in the English Church has decided that the latter is permissible; but, may Heaven be thanked, the Lambeth Conference possesses no canonical authority. I cannot help feeling that posterity will regard as one of the most deplorable chapters in the history of our Church the story of how its Bishops betrayed so great a trust.

ASHLEY SAMPSON.

WHAT IS A DISPENSATION?

THE question, What is a Dispensation? must be answered from the Canonists of the Western Church; not only because their experience is enormous and unrivalled, but also because they are the greatest exponents of the theory. Dispensations were practised for centuries before the theory was formulated. In the age of the Fathers there are illustrations and descriptions. There is, for instance, St. Cyril of Alexandria's graphic comparison of a Dispensation to casting some of the cargo overboard in a storm at sea: the application is that, when we have no security of saving all our possessions, we make less account of certain things among them, lest we should suffer the loss of all. But, as far as I know, there is no definition of a Dispensation during the first thousand years.

I

The earliest attempt at a definition is that by Gratian in the eleventh century: a merciful relaxation of a stricter discipline. In Gibert's Digest of the Canon Law (i. 65) published in 1737, a Dispensation is defined as a relaxation of the law by those who have authority to interpret the law. As defined by Ferraris in the *Bibliotheca Canonica* (1886), a Dispensation is a relaxing of the ordinary law by those who possess the required jurisdiction. Perhaps the best account is that by Suarez (d. 1617), who defines it as an act of jurisdiction by which the law is wounded through being partially set aside.

1. Suarez explains that the law which is liable to Dispensation is not Divine Law, but common or ecclesiastical law, or, as he prefers to call it, human law. The entire range of human law is susceptible to Dispensation.

2. Dispensation must be carefully distinguished from Interpretation, with which it has often been confused, but which is an entirely different thing. An Interpretation is concerned with a case where doubt has been raised whether the law applies, and is a decision that in this particular case the law does not apply. A Dispensation, on the contrary, presupposes a law to exist whose meaning is clear, and whose obligation is certain, and then proceeds authoritatively to remove that law from a particular person or persons, leaving the law still binding on the rest of the community. Thus Interpretation is *epieikeia*, a matter of learning and sagacity, whereas Dispensation is an act of jurisdiction.

3. Dispensation is also to be distinguished from an abrogation of the law, as a partial commutation is distinguishable from a complete abolition. The law remains in force, although in a particular case it is set aside.

4. Dispensation is quite different from Absolution. Possession of the power to absolve often exists without the power to dispense. Absolution is not given against the law, but in accordance with the law, and involves no relaxing of the law. But a Dispensation is against the law. That is an essential part of its definition. Absolution never grants permission to do what the law forbids. Dispensation does. Absolution requires repentance. Dispensation does not. Suarez says that St. Thomas adds another difference between the two. No authority can absolve himself, but he can grant himself a Dispensation. Absolution can only be conferred by a priest. Dispensation is sometimes delegated to a person who is not a priest. (See St. Thomas, 4th Book of the Sentences, Dist. 20, Q. 1, A. 5, q. 4 *ad* 3. In the Parma Edition, t. viii., par. 2, pp. 848 and 845.)

5. Consequently, a Dispensation is an act by which injury is inflicted upon the law. The law is wounded by being partially set aside. And the weakening of the law is injurious. This statement is generally repeated by the Canonists.

6. Further, a Dispensation is an act of jurisdiction. Consequently, it can only be granted by those by whom jurisdiction is possessed. Jurisdiction is either ordinary or delegated—that is, either inherent in the office assigned, or conferred by a superior authority.

Canonists have drawn an obvious and important inference from this. Since a Dispensation is an act of jurisdiction, it cannot be granted to those who are not under the dispenser's jurisdiction, nor to those who do not recognize his authority.

II

According to the Western Canonists, the authority to grant Dispensations exists in a graduated scale in five degrees—a Pope, a Council, a Bishop, a Priest, a Superior of a Religious Order. All these have authority in accordance with the extent of their jurisdiction.

1. The Roman theory is that the Pope's jurisdiction being universal, he has the right to define what cases of Dispensation are reserved to his own decision, and to exert a controlling influence over the dispensing power of every subordinate authority. Jurisdiction being defined as public authority, rule and direction over others (Ferraris), there is much speculation

among the later Western Canonists what the limits of papal jurisdiction, and consequently of Dispensation, may be.

2. The second authority able to grant Dispensations is a Council of the Church. If the Council is Ecumenical it can regulate Dispensations for the whole Church. If it is Provincial it can give Dispensations only within the Province to which it belongs. If it is Diocesan it can dispense for the Diocese, but subject to the rules of Councils superior to itself.

3. The third authority with power to grant Dispensations is a Bishop. His jurisdiction is either ordinary or delegated: inherent in his office, or else conferred upon him by a superior authority. Precisely what dispensing power is inherent in the office of a Bishop is a matter much debated by Western Canonists, and difficult to define, having varied considerably in different times and places. The tendency of the more recent Canonists is to have doubts about the ordinary power, and to lay stress on the delegated power of Episcopal Dispensations. A Bishop can grant Dispensations in the laws of the Province if the Provincial Council has left the matter to his discretion by such a phrase as "*donec dispensetur.*" That proviso—unless there is reason to the contrary—implies the individual Diocesan's right to proceed upon it. But he cannot in the absence of any Synodical Provincial authorization grant a Dispensation in debated subjects, the reason being that an inferior can have no jurisdiction over the law of his superior. The decision of the Episcopate of the Province is a law with which the individual Diocesan must comply.

Lehmkuhl says that a Bishop has authority to grant Dispensations in such laws as those concerning hearing Mass or observing fasting, and in all cases where Dispensation is expressly provided for in the law, also in cases of urgent necessity, even in matters which are expressly reserved to a higher authority than his own. There are also certain cases of irregularity affecting ordination, in which the Diocesan can dispense. Thus, for instance, the law is that a deacon must serve in that office for an entire year before being advanced to priesthood. But the Council of Trent allows that a Bishop may dispense with this law "for the utility and the necessity of the Church."

4. Authority to grant Dispensations also belongs to a Parish Priest. It is involved in his jurisdiction, whether ordinary or delegated. He has an ordinary jurisdiction in such matters as the law of fasting, the hearing of Mass on festival days. Custom authorizes this. He may also have a further delegated authority. And in cases of urgent necessity, but with grave precaution, he may dispense. (Lehmkuhl, i. 115, ii. 457, 1888.)

5. The Superior of a Religious Order may grant Dispen-

sations to those under his jurisdiction. Lehmkuhl deals with the case of Religious Orders under the jurisdiction of their own Superior and exempt from episcopal jurisdiction. He holds that the Superior of a Religious Order may accept for himself and for his house such general Dispensations as the Bishop grants to his Diocese. (*Theologia Moralis*, i. 115.)

Superiors of Religious Houses have themselves authority to grant Dispensations to their subjects. This authority applies to the common laws of the Church, such as fasting, abstinence, observance of festivals, and even in regard to vows. But they can only do this in the case of individuals, and not of entire Communities. (Lehmkuhl, i. 115.)

The effects of a Dispensation on the recipient are three: (1) It gives him permission to act against the law, but imposes no obligation to do so. Dispensations have been offered and declined. (2) It removes the penalty involved in disobedience to the law. (3) It sets the conscience free. (Suarez, vi. 56.)

An essential principle upon which the entire system depends for its security is that the ordinary power of Dispensation resides in the authority which creates the law. The accepted maxim of the Canon Law is "*Ejusdem est solvere cujus est ligare.*" (Gibert, i. 65; Suarez, vi. 56.) Thus a Provincial Council can dispense with its own regulations. A Bishop can dispense with the rules of his predecessors. But no inferior can grant Dispensation of the laws of his superior, unless of course the power is delegated or tacitly conceded. For the inferior can have no jurisdiction over his superior. *Lex superioris per inferiorem tolli non potest.* (Benedict XIV., *De Synodo*, ix. 1, par. 5.)

Suarez maintains that the individual members of a Provincial Council are subject to its regulations, and have no authority to grant Dispensations from them; also that the Metropolitan himself has no inherent right to give such Dispensation, but that a Provincial Council can confer upon the Metropolitan a dispensing power if the Bishops of the Province give unanimous consent.

In theory this graduated scale of authorities with power to grant Dispensations, each within its own peculiar jurisdiction, is a masterpiece of administrative genius. The higher orders of jurisdiction are restraining influences on the inferior. The individual Bishop, Priest or Head of a Religious House, are all in their several jurisdictions restricted. The theory of Dispensations depends for its rightful exercise on the various dispensers adhering strictly to their limits within this graduated scale. But theory is one thing, practice is another. In practice the dispensing power of the Roman See has grown very

extensive in the course of centuries. Modern Roman Canonists seem embarrassed by precedents created by laxer Popes, which presumably would not otherwise be approved, but cannot respectfully be ignored.

There is a decided tone of warning in their modern writers deprecating any increase of Dispensations. For instance, the necessity of caution and restraint is strongly urged. Ecclesiastical Superiors must pay attention not only to the present, but to the future as well. "The evil which now results from the refusal to grant a Dispensation may be the lesser evil: to be tolerated in view of the greater good which will result in the future to the whole moral body."

W. J. SPARROW-SIMPSON.

MISCELLANEA

THE ANCIENT ROMAN RITE

FATHER HEBERT'S report, in your March issue, of the conclusions of recent scholarship concerning the origin of the Use of the Church of Lyons leads on to some further interesting reflexions. Dom Buenner's book, *L'Ancienne Liturgie Romaine: le Rite Lyonnais*, to which Father Hebert refers, establishes the fact that the Lyons Use reproduces very adequately many of the ceremonial features of the Church of Rome in, and before, the days of Charlemagne; that it owes only a little to Gallican influence, and none at all to direct Eastern influence. But Dom Buenner's exposition of the Lyons Use shews another thing. What it shews as prominent features of the Lyons Use are at once recognizable as prominent features also of the Sarum and other ancient English Uses. By prominent features I do not mean necessarily those that the casual spectator might observe, but those that compose the ground-plan, the underlying structure, the genius of the whole. That common ground-plan represents the genius of the Roman Use before it became overlaid with odds and ends of ceremonies, culled from all manner of sources with a reckless disregard for the balance and coherence of the whole.

That is one reason why many Anglican Churchmen today feel an instinctive affinity with a ceremonial based upon the ground-plan of old English Uses. It is not from any love of Mediævalism, but because our old English Uses, like that of Lyons and other French dioceses, reflect very vividly (beneath their later accretions such as the Elevation ceremonies) the genius of old Rome.

With that genius (quite different from that of modern Italian Rome) the British genius has much in common. The love of what is practical rather than what is purely symbolical in ceremonies; the desire for splendour modified by austerity; the checking of piety with a strong dash of reserve—all these characterized the worship of old Rome, underlay the worship of mediæval England, and are reflected in the prefaces to, and in the rubrics of, the Book of Common Prayer.

The Anglican Church bases its claim to Catholicity partly on its loyalty in doctrine to the pre-mediæval Church. What could be more fitting than the expression of our worship under principles which obtained in that period in most Churches of the West and pre-eminently in Rome? It is to this period that the leaders of the Liturgical Movement in the Roman Church today look back with longing eyes. But they are hampered in their application of old principles by the newer laws of the Sacred Congregations. It would be foolish for us to be beguiled by appeals to be "Western" and up-to-date (in fact, to imitate modern Rome) when we already have enshrined in our own service books and rubrics that for which the most up-to-date Romans (not archæologists!) are hankering.

D. C. DUNLOP.

ST. MATT. XIX. 3-12

THE more fundamentally I differ from Mr. Holmes-Gore as to the interpretation of this passage, the more it seems to me that candour and courtesy require me to acknowledge that I cannot answer him when he argues that if there be what I called an "editorial providence of God" traceable in Holy Scriptures, one would have expected it to have prevented the insertion of the Matthean gloss "except for fornication." I do not want to abandon my belief in such a providence: but I cannot believe that our Lord said "except for *adultery*." Yet that is how our leading scholars now seem to understand *πορνεία* here and in v. 32. All I can say now is that I have never been able to see why it should not in these two passages mean *what it clearly means in xv. 19*—namely, pre-nuptial sin, such as St. Joseph feared in i. 19. But the problem of an editorial providence is larger than this, and I am baffled by it.

To prevent needless misunderstandings, may I add that I wholeheartedly believe that "marriage is a divine institution" (xix. 4-6), and that I did not mean to deny that "marriage is God's will for man" in a general way, or that faithful marriage is "*an ideal*." But Mr. Holmes-Gore twice wrote "the ideal"; and I thought he used all these phrases in contrast with celibacy. What I said and meant was that I could not find that teaching in verses 3-9, but only condemnation of divorce. The question of celibacy had not then been raised. The only other point of manageable size is that of the pursuit of perfection. I understand counsels of perfection, of which celibacy for the kingdom of heaven's sake is usually reckoned to be one, to be states of life directly or indirectly recommended by our Lord to such as could adopt them, as helping towards perfection. I do not think this doctrine implies that rich people or married people need not aim at perfection, or cannot attain to it: God forbid. To do so would be to set aside the teaching of xix. 26 as regards great wealth, and as regards holy matrimony would be scandalously untrue. "St. Catharine of Genoa . . . attained her perfection as a married woman and as a widow controlling a hospital and its affairs; . . . which illustrates this point.*"

May God in His mercy give us grace to understand each other better.

F. M. DOWNTON.

CORRESPONDENCE

A PARSON'S JOB

DEAR SIR,

I have just read Mr. W. H. Oldaker's interesting paper entitled "The Job of a School Chaplain" in the March number of *THEOLOGY*. I have no intention of criticizing anything in it, but only of pointing out the other side of the question that is raised by his observation on the inaudibility of clergy. I must confess, that although I entirely agree that the whole congregation (except those who are deficient in hearing) should

* *In Pursuit of Perfection*, p. 9. By S. Harton, herself a married woman. (Mowbray, 1936. 5s.)

be able to hear the whole service, I read Mr. Oldaker's paragraph with some alarm.

During the past ten years I have been very interested in voice production as it concerns the parson, audibility in churches, and the important point of the general effect of loudness in Church services, and have at the present moment a paper on the subject in course of preparation.

While inaudibility is without excuse (save for those priests who have made it almost a matter of conscience to approximate towards silent consecration in the Eucharist), there is no doubt that there is much entirely unnecessary and inappropriate shouting in the Church of England today. And while the congregation should be able to hear the priest's words, it is entirely unnecessary to shout prayers. The priest has to address his prayers to God, and as soon as he starts shouting them at the top of his voice the situation takes on an appearance of inappropriateness that sometimes amounts to unreality. A priest declaiming prayers or saying them far too loudly creates an atmosphere of noise and disturbance that is very destructive of any atmosphere of devotion. And although a large voice does not necessarily give the impression of any irreverence, a priest who says the Liturgy in a voice far louder than the size of the actual congregation requires is producing a disturbing element in the service. It is often found that a parson whose voice is admirable for large congregations has no realization how very loud he is when ministering to a small one.

The other circumstance in which clergy sometimes use their voice far too much is when they feel it is up to them to stimulate congregational singing. Congregational singing needs stimulating in the Church of England, and there are good ways of doing it; but if the parson sings himself at the top of his voice, he merely succeeds in making himself conspicuous without stimulating the congregation. I am convinced that there is far more inaudibility arising out of indistinct speech and lack of some good simple method of voice production than there is from any lack of loudness of voice.

May I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your readers to the frequent noise and sense of hurry produced by many a Sunday Evensong in parish churches?

I have found this in town and country alike. The service gives the impression of an express train. The Psalms and Canticles are noisy and hurried, the organ is noisy, we all go dashing on from one thing to another, until in the end we find ourselves at last in those refreshing moments of silence after the blessing, while everyone is waiting for everyone else to get up first. And I have often heard the laity say that this silence often seems to be the best part of the service. Whereas, on the other hand, the hymn singing, which should be the focus of "heartiness," is only too often the one feature of the service that is not loud enough.

I do not imagine that this important problem is easy of solution, but I am convinced, and I am sure many of your readers will agree, that something will have to be done one day about this hurried and noisy "non-stop" Evensong.

Yours faithfully,

JOHN A. HUMPHRIES,
Precentor of Peterborough Cathedral.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

THE January number of the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* opens with the first of a series of articles by Father G. Bardy on the extensive subject of literary frauds in Christianity antiquity. Apocalypses, Egyptian apocryphal writings, psuedo-epigraphic works, all fall into his capacious net, and he proceeds to include *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* and similar writings. His aim is clearly more to provide a conspectus of his subject than to furnish any detailed criticism. Father Constant examines the doctrinal changes in the Church of England during the reign of Edward VI. In an appendix he compares, and by implication sometimes contrasts, the Forty-two Articles of Edward VI. with the thirty-nine of Elizabeth. Father W. von Polnitz deals with apocryphal synods of Pope Symmachus and the similar bishoprics of Linternum and Gravisca. Father L. van der Essen writes a noble appreciation of Henri Pirenne and his attitude to ecclesiastical history. It is one of the ablest appreciations of this great Belgian historian that has appeared since his lamented death. Father B. Capelle writes of another great scholar, the late Dom Donatian De Bruyne. Among his many discoveries few of us will forget the sixteen pages he communicated to the *Revue Benedictine* for January, 1907. There he shewed that the short prologues or arguments prefixed to St. Paul's Epistles in most MSS. of the Latin Vulgate, and frequently printed in editions of the Bible, are the work of Marcion and were originally composed as headings for the Epistles in the Marcionite *Apostolicon*.

R. H. M.

Jewish Quarterly Review. Vol. xxvi., No. 3.

Dr. Israel W. Sloki, writing on Antiphony in Ancient Hebrew Poetry, finds indications of it as far back as Miriam's Song "And Miriam responded to them," and traces its influence in the Psalter and in Rabbinical writings. The following early reference to antiphony, which he quotes, in the Mishnah is easily accessible to the non-Hebraist in Danby's translation, pp. 298, 299 (Sotah 5, 4): "On that day Rabbi Akiba made this exposition: Then sang Moses and the children of Israel this song unto the Lord and spake saying . . . There was no need to have written 'saying.' Then why was it written 'saying'? It teaches that Israel was answering in song, repeating after Moses every word, as when Hallel is recited. Therefore 'saying' is written. Rabbi Nehemiah said, as Shema is recited, but not as Hallel." An interesting addendum to this article finds antiphonal chant in Babylonian poetry.

Dr. Paul Romanoff, in introducing E. L. Sukenik's recent volumes on ancient Jewish synagogues, concludes that mural paintings were in use in Babylon perhaps as early as the end of the second century, and that if art in Palestine is a reflection of Jewish art in Babylon mural paintings in the latter developed earlier than mosaics.

Professor Joseph Reider in his review of Biblical Literature finds high praise for the late Mrs. B. H. Box's *Judaism in the Greek Period* and for

Dr. W. E. Barnes's valuable commentary on the Psalms. Of Gunkel's posthumous *Einleitung in die Psalmen* he says—Gunkel's challenge to scholars to find one clear allusion to the Maccabean period in any of the canonical Psalms ought "to silence forever the reiterations of latter-day scholars that the bulk of the Book of Psalms was not composed before the Maccabean period."

R. D. MIDDLETON.

REVIEW

THE SPIRIT OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY. Gifford Lectures, 1931-1932. By Etienne Gilson. Translated by A. H. C. Downes. Sheed and Ward. 15s.

Perhaps the most striking movement in philosophical thought today is the revival of interest in scholasticism. This might, of course, be explained as nothing more than philosophical archæology; the scholastic philosophy is just as valid an object of examination as anything else for anyone who feels that way, quite apart from the question of its truth. But the matter goes deeper than this. It is not too much to say that the phenomenism which is the general characteristic of post-Renaissance philosophy has worked itself out by issuing in a virtual scepticism. For once you deny that the proper object of the intellect is being, and restrict perception to phenomena, you cannot put up any case against the solipsist. This appears with great force in so un-idealist a philosopher as Lord Russell, who, for all his rationalism, is obliged to fall back on sheer dogma in order to assert that anything exists outside his own experience (*Outline of Philosophy*, p. 302).

That the return to scholasticism is not purely antiquarian is shewn with extreme clearness by the appearance of such a work as Mr. E. A. Watkin's *Philosophy of Form*, which, although its whole outlook is in the scholastic tradition, is not afraid to make quite drastic departures from what has come to be generally realized as the scholastic position. The existence of spiritual matter, and the plurality of forms in the same object—what does St. Thomas say about these? But scholasticism is wider than Thomism; and this is true even (or should we say, especially?) of mediæval scholasticism.

These words of introduction are not without their point with reference to M. Gilson's Gifford Lectures, since there is still to be found, at least in England, a vague idea that scholasticism is simply Thomism and is, in any case, only to be qualified by such adjectives as "barren," "outworn," or "decadent." For there are four facts which stand out from a reading of this work: first, that scholasticism is not necessarily Thomism; secondly, that it need not be outworn; thirdly, that, so far from being barren, it is still capable of forming a starting-point for a new and better interpretation of the universe; and, fourthly, that, so far from being decadent, it provided the initial impetus

and the guiding ideas for that post-mediaeval philosophy which, in many of its supposedly most original departures, is merely a misapplication of misunderstanding of scholastic thought and far more justly merits the epithet "decadent" than does the system which it professes to have supplanted. Perhaps the really decadent last minstrel of scholasticism was Descartes. In any case, so unprejudiced a critic as the Archbishop of York has lamented as one of the world's blackest days that on which Descartes shut himself up "in his stove" to indulge in an orgy of doubt (*Nature, Man, and God*, Lecture III.), and this opinion at least suggests that perhaps the motto for a sound constructive philosophy today should be, if not exactly "Back to the Middle Ages," at any rate "On from the Middle Ages."

Professor Gilson's main contention is that there is a specifically Christian philosophy, and that scholasticism is not just an unintelligent pedestrianizing of Plato and Aristotle. He shews that the Judæo-Christian concept of God as Pure Being (the "metaphysic of Exodus," *Ego sum qui sum*) completely revolutionized the Greek view, which conceived of Him in terms of thought, and that it led to a fundamentally new outlook on the universe, which is summed up in the term "creation." The Christian God is not ontologically on equal terms with the world; He is self-existent necessary Being, while the world is derived contingent being. It is created by Him and for Him; he is both its Alpha and its Omega. This suggests interesting reflections on the Philosophy of Organism of Professor Whitehead, but we must pass on.

And, if the Christian philosophy has its own doctrine of God, so has it also of man. For man's unique characteristic is the imprint of the image of God in the gift of reason. *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine*. Now, God is the Pure Intelligible, and so man's intellect can be satisfied with nothing less than the vision of God. Nevertheless, because he is separated from God by the infinite gulf that divides the creature from its Creator, he cannot attain to this beatitude by the exercise of his own power; this is the explanation of his "homelessness" in this world and, incidentally, of the vanity of the naturalistic ethics (if, indeed, we can call it "ethics") of such writers as the self-tormented D. H. Lawrence and the self-disillusioned Mr. Aldous Huxley. Eternal life, the *visio Dei*, is man's proper end, but he can only receive it as a gift from God. M. Gilson's development leads to a most impressive discussion of the Cistercian mysticism, in which he demonstrates both its internal coherence and its consistence with the scholastic anthropology.

It is tempting to try to describe further the fascinating

avenues of thought along which M. Gilson leads us, but if once we began we should never stop. For in twenty chapters he ranges over the whole realm of philosophical thought. Ontology, anthropology (which in scholasticism does not mean the customs of the Melanesians), epistemology, the freedom of the will, the basis of morality, man's final beatitude, all receive consideration in masterly fashion, the adequacy and conciseness of which defy summary. It is of no use to try to describe such a book as this; all one can do is to recommend it. It is much more than a study of mediæval philosophy; it is indirectly a magnificent apologia for Catholic Christianity, and, in these days when Christians so often seem to be afflicted with a sense of intellectual inferiority, nothing can be so encouraging as this fine exposition of the architectonic power of the Christian revelation. There is nothing of the propagandist about M. Gilson. The reader will not find the quite blind adoration of St. Thomas which characterizes M. Maritain; he will find M. Gilson frequently preferring St. Bonaventura or Duns Scotus to St. Thomas and conscious of the limitations of all three; but he will realize as never before the amazing intellectual fecundity of the Christian religion. It is much to be hoped that the title of M. Gilson's book will not lead the public to suppose that it is only a work for the expert in the study of the Middle Ages; it is a book that the general student of Christianity simply cannot afford to miss, and it is one the reading of which would give objectivity and conviction to the utterances of many a perplexed parish priest. Its style is clear and fascinatingly readable, the translation is excellent, and the format admirable. And, like all great philosophical books, it should assist in no little degree its readers' devotions, for prayer, like philosophy, is concerned with the truth.

There is an apparent misprint on page 313, which will bewilder the reader if it is not corrected. In the last line "inadmissible" should presumably be "inamissible"—the exact opposite.

E. L. MASCALL.

NOTICES

A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH. Vol. II. "The Church and the World the Church Created." Philip Hughes. Sheed and Ward. 15s.

The rather cumbrous sub-title can only be understood in relation to the sub-titles of the other two volumes of the history. Volume I. is entitled "The Church and the World in which the Church was Founded," Volume III., "The Church and the Revolt against it of the Church-created World." The theory of this volume, then, is that the formative influence in European civilization from the beginning of the fourth to the end of the thirteenth century was that of the Catholic Church. The point is not that every element in that civilization was of ecclesiastical origin: that would be patently untrue; but that the Church succeeded in dictating to the mediæval culture what elements from other civilizations it should accept and what it should reject. The Church as the one stable element in a chaotic world not only presents that world with something essentially permanent and true, but also, through the very fact of chaos, absorbs into itself the leadership of all the forces of order.

Mr. Hughes's references to the development of the Papal power and influence are interesting and candid.* The most striking is a passage under the heading of the Roman See and the Western Churches. He points out that there are two things worthy of note in this respect during the first three centuries: the first is that there is hardly any mention of the Roman Church at all; the second that what we do know of it is almost entirely confined to the exercise of an occasional primatial supervision over other Churches. What, then, is the origin of the present arrangement by which the direct and immediate authority of the Pope is felt in every corner of Roman Catholic Christendom? This has not grown, Mr. Hughes asserts, out of the original universal supervision—the right to which was claimed from time to time; it is rather an extension of the powers wielded by the Pope as Primate of All Italy. If this view is really characteristic of modern Papalist historical scholars, it is hardly possible to exaggerate its importance. For it reduces the *essential* powers of the Papacy to a truer historical proportion and display, the modern omnipresent influence of the Curia as a development of the accidental primacy which belonged to the Pope as a highly important Metropolitan. It is indeed difficult to claim divine authority for the universal immediate and ordinary jurisdiction of the Pope if it is acknowledged that *this* jurisdiction is not even rooted in the original universal primacy at all, but developed out of something quite different. Whether this can be squared with the Vatican definitions is another matter. Perhaps it can: for although the definitions assert the divine authority of St. Peter's primacy and its juridical character, and go on to claim divine right for that primacy as held by his successors, they do not assert that the ubiquitous immediate authority now enjoyed by the Roman Pontiff is a matter of divine appointment.

* As usual, however, the word *etiam* is ignored in his translation of St. Augustine's remarks on the condemnation of Pelagius. The result is to give a false emphasis to the share of the Roman See in that condemnation.

So, the author tells us, in Gaul in the sixth century, "each bishop was a law unto himself." Rome was far away, and, by now, in a foreign country where a heretic ruled.

Again, in the eighth century, the direct dependence of the newly converted Germans upon Rome is assigned to the "*desire* of immediate control" which had been the "policy" of the Roman See since the fourth century.

Little by little we are allowed to see the primitive "solicitude" for the whole Church develop into an autocratic power constantly exercised over all its members. The theory initiated by Innocent III. that the Pope is the Vicar not so much of Peter as of God—"this splendid instrument" Mr. Hughes calls it—implies and actually produced a universal initiative very different from the supervisory power of the ancient Popes. Church and State fall under this power, and the Popes claim not only to excommunicate the Prince, if necessary, but to direct his policy in the Name of God.

Mr. Hughes is not always easy to read. His sentences, especially in the latter part of the volume, tend to be laborious. But he is to be congratulated on completing the second stage of a work which needed, above all things, learning, frankness and a synoptic vision; all these the author possesses in full measure.

✠ KENNETH BRECHIN.

SOCIAL SALVATION. By J. C. Bennett. Scribners. 6s.

GOD AND THE COMMON LIFE. By R. L. Calhoun. Scribners. 8s. 6d.

SPEAKING OF RELIGION. By B. Curry. Scribners. 6s.

If these books can be taken as representative, American Protestantism is in process of shaking off the liberalism of the nineteenth century, both in its theology and in its social philosophy. The rude economic shocks of recent years, the humanist attempt to build a non-theistic religion of spiritual values, the rough handling of liberal humanitarianism in theology by the dialectical theologians of Europe, have been some of the forces which have compelled liberal Protestants in America, as elsewhere, to call in question the presuppositions of their religious thinking. The need for a positive theistic doctrine, as the necessary foundation for anything that can be called Christianity, is being increasingly felt, and the vaguely immanentist sentiment of much "liberal Christianity" is today dismissed as "attenuated" and "washed out." There are now candid and vigorous minds in the American colleges arguing persuasively and well for a definitely God-centred religion, as against humanism on the one hand and dialectical materialism on the other.

At the same time they remain liberal and progressive, and refuse to relapse either into fundamentalism or into pietism. Nor will they be Barthian. Their doctrine of God is not allowed to weaken a robust belief in the importance of human effort, especially in the sociological field. The Barthian teaching of divine transcendence and human helplessness and corruption is rather shocking to practical Americans, and the "social gospel" and other practical applications of Christianity are kept well in the forefront of religious interest. Professor Bennett and Professor Calhoun are both concerned to bring their theology to bear on the economic

and social life of today. Professor Bennett, whose book is the best of the three, deals with large-scale social questions, such as war and the economic ordering of society, insisting on the interdependence of individual and social salvation. His book might well be read by any who are troubled by the much discussed problem of whether Christianity has anything to do with politics and economics. It seems to us an able and well-informed statement of the need for a social Christianity, and in particular for a Christian criticism of the existing order of social life. The theological discussion of the nature of sin, with which the book opens, is the weakest part of the argument.

Professor Calhoun brings a vigorous intelligence and a highly coloured and exuberant style to the discussion of daily work as a vocation, and asks whether in the "power age" it is still possible to apply the Protestant theory of vocation to the work done by the majority of industrial wage-earners of today. With the help of St. Thomas (an interesting sign of the times) and of what he refers to as "the contemporary tendency called religious realism" he manages to bring the Calvinistic doctrine up to date. The latter half of the book is a rather irrelevant but decidedly able essay in philosophical theology, and deals with such grave matters as the existence and nature of God and the nature of mind. The study is elaborate and cast in a grandiose philosophical style, but Professor Calhoun is both learned and acute.

Professor Curry, though he, too, rejects the "theological thinness of extreme Christian liberalism" and its "romantic view of human nature and progress," might still be described as a left-wing liberal. He wants a revision of existing Christianity. There is, it appears, "low" Christianity, which is distressingly prevalent still, and cannot bear "the scrutiny of the scientific approach," whatever that means; there is also "high" Christianity, which is intellectually, morally, and spiritually superior, and knows it. If we want to discover what "high" Christianity is, we find that among other things it thinks of God as "the Universe Personality," that it is "open-minded" about immortality, and that while it is "not interested in whether Jesus could be the Jewish Messiah" it is "deeply indebted to Jesus as a prophet and teacher." Not unexpectedly Professor Curry does not like St. Paul. The book has great moral earnestness and no humour. It has not much religious or theological depth.

H. BALMFORTH.

-
1. THE ALDINE BIBLE: NEW TESTAMENT. Vol. III. The Pauline and Pastoral Epistles. Edited by M. R. James, assisted by Delia Lyttelton. Engravings by Eric Gill. Dent. 5s.
 2. O MEN OF GOD. By Canon B. Iddings Bell. Longmans. 2s. 6d.
 3. THIS OUR PILGRIMAGE. By Canon Peter Green. Longmans. 2s. 6d.
 4. THE CHRIST OF EXPERIENCE. By Beatrice Ferguson. Longmans. 6s.
 5. CORNER STONES OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION. By Canon A. E. Simpson. Mowbray. 2s. 6d.
 6. THE SOUL'S DISCIPLESHIP. By Father Andrew, S.D.C. Mowbray. 2s. 6d.
- PRAYER. By Arthur Chandler, D.D. C.L.A. 1s.

If you received these seven books, all done up together in a parcel, what would you do with them? I assume that you would read them. Probably, though, your shelves are already well filled, and you would not want to keep all seven. Who would be suitable recipients if you decided to give them away?

The first on our list could be easily placed. I am told that one of the most usual results of a purely secular education is to make young people very inquisitive about religion. "The Bible," cried a woman student, bursting into the Principal's study, "is a *magnificent* book! *Why was not I told?*" You must know many boys and girls who have been badly and unChristianly brought up, and who are feeling that they have been cheated out of their rightful heritage. It might be rash to do anything as old-fashioned as to choose ordinary Bibles for their birthday presents. Here, however, you have the Pauline and Pastoral Epistles printed as though they might be a book by T. S. Eliot or Aldous Huxley, and with engravings doubtless beautiful and significant to the modern eye. The text has not been tampered with, notes are unobtrusive, paper and print are admirable. Your young barbarian will read the volume, and he will love it, for he is alert to notice what is best. He may forget to write and thank you—it does not matter, his guardian angel gives you unuttered thanks.

It may be a trifle harder to dispose satisfactorily of Canon Iddings Bell's Lenten volume. It is a brave book and a forceful book, but extremely unsuited for Lenten reading. In Lent, surely, we wish to come apart with God, and to clear our vision, not by staring at the dust kicked up by the hurrying world, but by contemplating the light which streams from Calvary. There is too much noise and dust in these pages. Political prophecy, too, which does not in the least convince me; though Canon Bell condemns my "thought-forms" as antiquated, if I disagree with him, and hints that I had better die out. I should like to order him a holiday, and send him away with Father Andrew's book, or the exquisite treatise on Prayer that Dr. Chandler has given us, and tell him to keep Lent in solitude. After that, he could write a much better Lenten book. I am giving my own copy of *O Men of God* to a Londoner who would have bought it for herself if I had not provided it. Rather a weak way of solving the problem of its disposal, I fear.

Is "large-hearted" a proper adjective to apply to a book? That is what I should like to call Canon Green's *This our Pilgrimage*. "Thoughts on the Christian Life" is the sub-title, but "thoughts" is too abstract-sounding a word to describe what is in these pages. Warm hand-clasps; messages from friend to friend; laughter and tears; "quiet times"; the "earnest looking forward" of the true pilgrim. A good book.

Give one copy to your vicar. Another to the most tiresome person in the parish, to shew him, or her, what the vicar is trying to do in the world. A third to the most helpful person in the parish, who does not need the book, but who will enjoy it all the more for having all its wisdom in his (or perhaps more likely, her) heart already.

Authors suffer much at the hands of blurb-writers, and Beatrice Ferguson has been hardly treated. "People with educated and sensitive minds interested in religion, but dissatisfied with the conventional presentation of Christianity, will welcome this book." "People with——": ourselves, of course. We are not going to put ourselves down as uneducated and insensitive, "dissatisfied with——"? With what, exactly? Who are the contemporary authors guilty of being con-

ventional? (Evidently the phrase cannot refer to the remembered authors of the past—the purely conventional have been forgotten)—the Archbishop of York, the Bishop of Croydon, Canon Raven, Dr. Carnegie Simpson, Father Bede Frost, Fathers Knox and Vidler; I take a few names at random. Is any one of these conventional? I cannot agree with all of them, I fear, but I do not feel dissatisfied with them for being conventional. In any case, I am ill equipped for welcoming Beatrice Ferguson's book, which seems to be wordy and tedious. Dare I say that I find it conventional, too?

"Christ is the music of man's selfhood. Christ is the depth experience can bring" on p. 3, and 221 intervening pages up to "The experience of Christ is an ultimate stretching beyond the limitations of language, impervious to analysis or proof," have conveyed nothing to my mind, except a dim feeling that I should like to welcome the authoress and not her remarks. She is a good woman, and will, perhaps, forgive.

As for the volume itself, I shall give it to a library. Other people will enjoy it. I had better stop at the library and look up the exact meaning of "conventional."

Corner Stones of the Catholic Religion is a book that we have been waiting for. It takes the great landmarks of the Christian Faith and describes them clearly, reverently and beautifully. What is more, it places them in perspective, so that the whole prospect, in its symmetry and harmony, is seen as manifestly divine. You might object that Canon Simpson has brought no special originality to his task. But why should he? He has brought freshness, understanding and thoughtful care, and the result is admirable.

A copy of the book might well be handed to those young married people who are so much in earnest and so vague, and who long to give an adequate answer to the questions that the babies will inevitably ask: "Who made me?" and "Why must I be good?" Another should certainly be offered to your friend the Free Church minister, who is trying so hard to shepherd his flock in the right path, and who cannot understand why you think a priest is better equipped than he is. It would be quite a good idea to distribute the book widely among gloomy persons who imagine that the City of God is in a very bad way indeed, and that soon there will be only a few ruins left. In fact, I would tempt you to spend rather more than you can afford, if I did not wish you to be even more lavish with *The Soul's Discipleship* and Dr. Chandler's book on Prayer.

Father Andrew, as you know, writes very beautifully. He writes as a poet writes, and as painters and musicians write, as a troubadour of God writes. ("O Lord, open Thou our lips, and our mouth shall shew forth Thy praise.") If I were to meet him, though, I should not care to say, "How beautifully you write!" for he would surely be a little saddened if I did. All he would want to know would be that his meditations on the ancient prayer "Anima Christi, sanctifica me" had helped me to enter more deeply into its spirit. And that, indeed, is true.

Prayer is a wonderful little book. It begins so simply and quietly that you think there can't be much in it; and, after all, who could say anything adequate on Prayer within the span of a shilling booklet? And, then, as you go on, you find a hush and a radiance and a loveliness which are impossible to describe. If only we all knew all that this little book contains!

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

IN CHRISTUS. By Werner Schmauch. Gütersloh (Bertelsmann), 1935. 5.80 RM.

A very elaborate investigation into the use of the phrases *ἐν χριστῷ* 'Ιησοῦ, *ἐν χριστῷ*, and *ἐν κυρίῳ* by St. Paul. The writer seeks to develop the conclusions reached by Professor E. Lohmeyer in his *Grundlagen Paulinischer Theologie* (1929). With A. Deismann he insists upon the importance of the right interpretation of these formulæ for the understanding of St. Paul's theology.

F. L. CROSS.

STUDIES IN EARLY ROMAN LITURGY. III. THE ROMAN EPISTLE-LECTIONARY. By Walter Howard Frere, D.D. Oxford University Press. 2ls.

This publication of the Alcuin Club is the third of Bishop Frere's *Studies*, the earlier ones having dealt with the Kalendar and the Roman Gospel-Lectionary. The somewhat intricate subject is treated with the author's usual lucidity, which brings out several liturgical details of interest.

The list of "Epistles" (the term here includes all lessons read at Mass other than the Gospel ones) is taken from the Corbie MS. of the tenth century, now at Leningrad. It begins with Christmas Eve. It is, with the exception of a few easily distinguished later additions, the "Standard" List of Epistles. There is, however, available an earlier list, found in a Würzburg MS. of the eighth century, and this is valuable for comparison; and there is another type of list bearing the name of Alcuin, independent of the above, the original MS. being in Paris.

It will be of interest to Anglican readers to note that the Corbie MS. has all the red-letter days of the English 1622 Prayer Book, except the Circumcision, Conversion of St. Paul, St. Mark, St. Thomas, the Purification and the Annunciation; St. Peter and St. Paul are separate items. It has also several, but not many, liturgical days which are in Black Letter in the 1602 Book, and others not included therein; it has not got the Transfiguration. The Standard List has the Invention of the Cross, to which the Corbie MS. adds the Exaltation of the Cross and the "Letania Maior." The Standard List has the four Ember Seasons, of the "first," "fourth," "seventh," and "tenth" months; but it is to be noted that the summer Ember Season does not coincide with Whit-Week. In the Standard List it follows the third Sunday after Pentecost; in the Würzburg MS. (as in "Alcuin") it follows the Octave of Pentecost. In neither list is the Octave of Pentecost called "Trinity Sunday," and in the Würzburg MS. it is called "Dom. in nat. Sanctorum," with Epistles which recall the Eastern custom of celebrating an All Saints festival on that day. The Würzburg MS. has no feasts of the Blessed Virgin Mary; the Standard List has the Assumption, and the Corbie MS. adds the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin; the Purification and the Annunciation are first added in "Alcuin."

Dr. Frere explains fully the puzzling question of the "Comes" ("Companion") or collection of lessons for Mass. This term appears in the ninth century, but soon disappeared from the MSS., though it is found in later liturgical commentaries; and to MSS. from the tenth century onwards we owe the supposed "Letter to Constantius," or Prologue, by Jerome, which is the source of the tradition that the Comes was the work

of that Father. There are six texts of it, and Dr. Frere gives that found in the Corbie MS.; he says that it is "fairly safe to assume that the letter is a pseudonymous production of the early part of the eighth century." That Jerome made a list of Epistles and Gospels is quite possible; but there is no reason to suppose that the Comes is in any real sense his work.

Dr. Frere describes the development of Epistle Lists and Gospel Lists, which were soon grouped together, though originally separate. We owe him a great debt for his careful and lucid *Studies*.

A. J. MACLEAN,
Bishop.

A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN EPISCOPAL CHURCH. By the Rev. W. W. Manross. Price 2 dollars 75 cents. Morehouse Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

For the first century and a half of its existence the American Church possessed no bishops and had no Confirmation. Its clergy were chiefly provided from England, by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which also raised much of the money for their stipends. When candidates for the ministry arose in America it was necessary for them to make a long and expensive journey to England for ordination. Not uncommonly they died on the voyage, or were lost by shipwreck. Absence of episcopal oversight was largely responsible for the long tale of unsatisfactory clergy; for in a country lacking the restraints of English life there were many who needed discipline and guidance. Nor could the Church gain cohesion apart from its natural bond of union, the episcopate.

The trouble lay not merely in the unwillingness of English kings and their ministers to agree to the necessary legislation; it was partly due to the suspicions of the colonial mind. Men who had accepted the hardships of life overseas in order to secure more freedom did not want bishops like the English ones, peers with temporal authority. As soon as the Revolution came and America was free, all obstacles disappeared, and within a few years bishops were found, Seabury of Connecticut obtaining his consecration from Scotland, and White and Provoost from Canterbury. Then for the first time the American Church, in spite of being weakened by loss of English grants and of the services of some of its best men, could enjoy its full Catholic life.

Mr. Manross has given us a detailed account of the rise and progress of the Church. Scarcely any name or movement of consequence in the long history is omitted from his survey. For the romance the reader must use his imagination. But romance there is, undoubtedly. It needed a mighty effort to follow the incessant movement of pioneers to the ever-receding frontier in the nineteenth century, and to establish at last an episcopal organization over the whole land. At present the American Church is weak. She is marked, as Mr. Manross admits, by "upper-classishness," not having yet learned how to become the Church of the common people. But no observer can doubt that she possesses the essentials, which non-episcopal bodies lack. And as she is one with us in ideals and sympathies, English Churchmen might well read this book and learn something of her story.

G. W. BUTTERWORTH.

BEOWULF AND THE SEVENTH CENTURY. Language and Content. By Ritchie Girvan. Methuen. 3s. 6d.

WIDSITH. Edited by Kemp Malone. Methuen. 10s. 6d.

These books will hardly appeal to readers of THEOLOGY unless they are trained students of Anglo-Saxon literature. But the general reader, especially he who is interested in the conditions prevailing in England just before Aidan preached in the north—the background sketched by Mr. Girvan—or about the time that Bede was writing there—the age to which Mr. Malone assigns the writing of *Widsith*—will find some matter for instruction in these volumes. Both are concerned with life and letters in Northumbria, though one poem is in the Anglican dialect and the other in the West Saxon. Mr. Girvan's little book contains the three lectures delivered at University College, London, last year. It is more the readable of the two, and includes chapters on the language, the background and the relationship between folk-tale and history in *Beowulf*. The two last chapters are really interesting, and at the end he concludes that Beowulf was a real personage, on the ground that legendary accretion, on the analogy of medieval decoration of the deeds of Richard I. of England, is no incontrovertible sign of fiction. But it is possible that Mr. Girvan might have carried his argument further—for example, it does not occur to him that the folklore tales of dragons may represent reports, handed down through a hundred generations, of the flying monsters who survived amidst primitive man from earlier geological ages.

Mr. Malone's book is certainly for the specialist. It devotes 202 pages to a poem of 143 lines. The Introduction will be useful to students reading for honours in English, but there are nearly a hundred pages of excellent biographical and topographical notes, which the general student of Saxon times will certainly find useful. It has a glossary of Saxon words found in the poem, and an extensive bibliography.

Widsith apparently was a cleric, who wrote his poem, which includes earlier work, in West Saxon dialect, at the end of the seventh century, during the first half of Bede's life. Although apparently a West Saxon, he deals with conditions in Northumbria, Scandinavia, and among certain Teutonic tribes on the Baltic, the Rhine, and elsewhere. We are not convinced by the commentator's suggestion that line 84 of the poem does not refer to the Medes and Persians. They surely come quite naturally in a context which refers also to Israelites, Hebrews, Indians and Egyptians. Moreover, why does this edition in most cases print German substantives with small capitals?

A. J. M.

BOOK NOTES

The Church Catholic. By N. Micklem, D.D. S.C.M. Press. 1s. 6d. Addresses delivered at the request of the Friends of Reunion, by one with special opportunities of acting as a bridgemaker; most attractively written.

Psychology and God. By L. W. Grensted. *The Problem of Right Conduct.* By Peter Green. These valuable books are now reissued by Messrs. Longmans the publishers, at the low prices of 5s. and 3s. 6d. respectively.

My Notebook on St. John. By W. H. Counsell. Heffer. 3s. 6d. This is one more attempt to find a pattern in the Fourth Gospel. There are seven themes, with an Epilogue. Thus VI. (chapters xviii., xix.) is "the story of the tragic conflict occurring when the Higher Term in Consciousness is jealously regarded by the Lower." As in many other such books, we recognize some measure of reality, but surely it is in the author's mind rather than in the document studied. The Gospel is allegorical. Galilee "is the mind which will welcome further light." Capernaum "is the secular mind." Simon is "the soul in action." Judas (not Iscariot) "is the inability of the minor mind to enter into the major"; etc. Perhaps the touchstone of Mr. Counsell's method is best found in his comment on "Philip goeth and telleth Andrew; Andrew cometh and Philip and they bring them to Jesus"—"The very simplicity of the phrasing ought to have created a suspicion that there was a buried meaning in the words."

The Apocalypse and the Present Age. By H. L. Goudge, D.D. Mowbrays. 2s. Dr. Goudge long ago published an admirable pamphlet on the Apocalypse and the War. The same method is used to good effect in these lectures to clergy. He cannot in the time allotted get down to the real problems of this baffling book. But he is able to shew how much alive the Bible is, and to point the way to a happy combination of topical and expository preaching.

W. K. L. C.

Owing to pressure of space we are only able to acknowledge receipt of the following books:

The Fruits of Redemption. By H. W. Workman. Skeffington. 3s. 6d. *Short Sermons for the Church's Seasons.* By S. N. Statham. Skeffington. 3s. 6d. *Forty Lent Readings for Business People.* By L. B. Ashby. Skeffington. 2s. 6d. *The Legacies of Christ.* By Alfred Thomas. Skeffington. 2s. 6d. *Apart with Jesus.* By D. C. Tibbenham. Skeffington. 2s. 6d. *Successful Living.* By E. N. Porter Goff. Longmans, Green. Skeffington. 3s. 6d. *Worship and Intercession.* By Ruth Hardy. Longmans, Green. 3s. 6d. *Religion in Life.* By various authors. Longmans, Green. 3s. 6d. Extracts from various "Bishop of London's Lent Books."